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the time. rn Germany 'riedflrich Schlelermacht:3r, an outstanding 
Protestant theologian of the day, was emphasizing feeling in re-
ligion. Religion tor him was had in and through the 1nrinlite, 
and ."orytblng tomporal, in and through the eternal. This pan-
theistic tone was the theologicaleeho ot Spinoaan philosophy, 
which was havln,~ its moat recent fling 1n Le •• lng'. l!1mlmRIE 
DE'IIlMEll •• and Friedrich Jacobi t • A~.~.~ D£'I'~YBi, 
along with the wO:"ks or men like J. G. Hammon.2 
H. L. Martensen, pt'oloundly influenced by Hegel, attemp. 
ted a speculative theology which c.;uld mediate between rational1. 
and orthodoxy. His attempt involved the Ufie ot the Hegelian dIa-
lectic with ,Q doctrine or existence (DI.'6a) by whioh he cou.ld me-
diate everything in the world which bad metl.nlng in e xlstence. 
Hence nature and bist<Jry, poetry and art, along with vhl1osophy 
would harmoniously unite to torm a temple of' the spirit in whicb 
Christianity woulc be ~le all-governing and all-explaln1ng center. 
Martensen supposedly had removed all difficulti.. confronting rea-
son. Along with. Martensen the men of his time confused ethics 
\#1 th contemplation, Cbristianity with abstract speculation.) 
The influence ot He~~ellanl_ on Christian! ty brought 
about a Gplrit1ual bankruptcy and a perveralon ot the meaning ot 
2 For a further consideration ot the philosophera men-
tioned above, Me Fr1erick Ueberweg, a'fxQH .Qt. ~!~!Qf~' New York, trans. by Geo. S. Moris, 1903, Vo .,-Y2 .-200. 
J John Bain, Seren Klerkegaard. London, 38.108. 
J 
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hristianity as it had formerly been accepted. It was this Hege-
ian theology which was the pale substitution for the Christian-
ity formerly held even by the Lutherans. 
The philosophical prelude to this Hegelian field-day 
ad its roots as tar back as Huma's subjective interpretation ot 
eality. Alter Hum., Kant's ph~losophy of apEiszt'. had been 
the German Universities. F1chte. a onetime student or 
supplanted the Rh~nQm!n2n and QoumenoQ ot his former 
aster with his "'Transcendental I.1f This "Transcendental 1" or 
"I-am-I" Kierkegaard satirized in his general rejection ot spec-
lat1ve philosophy as the answer to his problem. Schelling had 
sen teaching radical indifferentism in which the real and the 
deal were identified. This indifferentism was perceived and its 
otion was started by intellectual intuitionism. Adolf Trendel-
nburg. who was a professor at the University of Berlin and a 
7reat Aristotelian scholar, was at this time a severe critic ot 
ant, Hegel, and Spinoza. His objections to some of Kantts pro6 
ed to prolonged discussions with Kuno Fischer, Professor at 
ena. and other men of repute. Such opposition to the German 
of philosophy was not without significance for Kierke-
It would seem that Kierkegaard was greatly influenced by 
rendelenburg. This influence is indicated in Kierkegaardts 
The philosophy chairs and publlcationsot Klerkegaard f s 
4 
day wGre not 4l the only sources tor dissemination ot the schoel ot 
Oerman philosophy. The poets did their part" too. Friedrich 
Schiller popularised tho moral and esthetic doctrines ot Kant. 
John ~)aul Richter, known for his dialogue on t.he immortal! ty ot 
the 50ul. itumt1ntttct.U!l. val the tor.runner or the romantic move-
ment. nichter was aleo a contemporary of K1erkegaarct. Friedrich 
von Hardenberg. known aa Noviali., and Tieck, who were 11kewiae 
cont mporar:i.ee of Kierkegaard, were the more outstanding publi-
ci.era of romanticism in poetry. Friedrich Jehlegel, another con-
t~mporary or K1erkeg,.;ard and author or L~2ins1!h atter contributing 
much to the ~'5iii .g! &!tlitJal ultimrJ.tely turned to the Cat,holic 
fa1th.4 
On Octooer )0, 18)0, S~ren Kierkegaard matriculated In 
t.he Uniyer~1t.y l;;t Oopenhagen aft.et" paasing hiG examiMtions .ma. 
laJd.dl..5 He cbose the faculty or theology in oon£ormlt.y w1t.h his 
fatherta w1:iJh. His brother, Peter, had already passed hi. tneo-
logical examination in Copenhagen and Wf1a studying tor a dootor-
ate in O ...... any. After a year Ki$rke,aarc1 passed the "Seoond Ex-
4 For further discussion or the ph1losophers, theolo-
gian. and rom8ntloiata 01 Ki.negaardts day •• e James Col11n8, 
"The Spheres otlSxi$tenee and the Romantic Outlook" and "The 
Attack Upon He€:e11anl_t " Sfd1ij ~S}l.5lQ~' lVI, January, 1949, ~21-129. And March, 1949, . 9-4 1 respect vely. 
S 'or extensive biographical material on Kierkega4rd 
see Via 1 tel" Lowrie; K,1, ~~Z:~!i'lim ,London, 19)6. 
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amination'i't in Latin, Greek, physIcs, Hebrew, and h1sta:!:"}' with the 
rating ot JlW! liuSI- .tn philosophy and mathem6itl08, he received 
the cl'tatlon :LiMaIRill. Jl£U Q!5~.tlI. He was now a oandidate· tor 
theology and could take hls examination whenever ho felt. prepare4 
But it was not until nine years later, in 1$40, that Klerkegaard 
received h1u license to exerci88 the pastoral alnlatry. During 
these nine lears Kle;,'kegaard wi tn. s eed the death ot his mother 
4'ld tat.l'U:u:·, Ii 'broth<tr twenty-tour years old, Mnd two slstera twen-
ty-three year$ old. In lEU? at the age ot twenty-a8ven he became 
engaged to Regina Olsen, who was then seventeen years old. This 
c:mga.gement K10rkegaard broke on October 11, 1841. The NaGOn tor 
this decision according to K1erkegaard was that he did not wish 
to subjeot aegina to tho inborn melan.choly 'W!1ich he inherited 
froul h18 fatber.6 
Atter this experience with Regina Olsen, Klerkegaard 
turned agti.in to .trudy and writing.!' It was Ludvig Keibers who 
first introduced Hegelianism into the University of Copenhagen. 
Heiberg bad atudled under Hegel and had a pereanal eateem for hi. 
master. But it was H. L. lI..artensen who made Hegeliani_ t; .. e lead-
ing and r-.;.llng philosophy in Denmark. .Martenaent a attempt to re .... 
eonoil. Ohristian orth.odoxy .and Hegelianism in hl. Ya&rM"&SI, 
6 
'" Chr1stllR: Ethi2fh and other works was ot pivotal importance for, 
and an object of Kierkegaardts most bitter and sustained attaeks 
against sseeula~1ve philosophy as theexplanatlon ot Christianlt~ 
. Though K1erkegaard had admiration for Hegel·· he never 
tired ot heaping invectives upon Martensen who. otaessed by 
the fixed idea of the agel always claimed to go "beyond He-
gel. To Kierkegaard, "go ng beyondft Hegel was something 
like living in the country·where one's letters had to be ad-
dressed .Y1A a big town. In this ease the address was John 
Doe I!i 1Ie'gel.7 
'fhis philosophy which Klerltegaard -studied was that ot 
Hegel. It was a philosophy of the Absolute. This absolute was 
regarded as being beyond the contradictory relationships which 
were comprehended within itselt. A eonstant prooess of evolution 
was neoessitated tor the mediation or contradictories through di-
alectics. By this logical prolression, the immanent idea unfol-
ded itself and became more apparent. TIle initial stage ot this 
process was one or absolute indeterminism. The evolution vas 
toward the determinate. Such a philosophy was hardly the one to 
ans'\'l1er so concrete 8. problem as was Kierkegaard t s. His reaction, 
a.s might have been expected. was strong. In the follo\'iing state-
ment Kierkegaard hits at the core of Hegelian weakness. 
We certainly do not need Hegel to inform us that relative 
contradictions oan be mediated, tor it is already told by 
the ancients, ••• but personality will protest in all eter-
nity against the proposition that absolute contradictions 
•• 
7 
can be wediated (and this protest ia incommensurable with 
the assertion of the mediation); it wIll in all etenlity 1"0-
peat. ftsimmortal dilemma: to be or not to be-that is the 
quest.lOlh8 
The oo,sic d1tficulty or the thinking ot 1'11& age, accor-
ding to Kierkegaard. was t,he divorce or 11te from thinking. In 
Ancient Oreace, ph11030phy rUtd always maintuined a relation to 
et:1ica. and a thinker wao "an ex1s1;ing individual atimulated by 
his refl$ction to p~u:,u:Jionat. enthulldaerth,,9 --Again-'fhe difference 
between Kierkeliaa,l"d,f s way of thinkine and that ot the ph11oso-
p!H;lrs ot hi. day is evident. Hi. 'day o.tt.h1nk:lng was practioel, 
concerned wit#h the concrete indivldual. In ;3ocrates lU.e:rkegaar4 
found Ai thinker to his liking. He looked upon him as his proto-
type. For Kifu'kegaard Socrates was theex18ting phUoGopher in 
whom thought and living were united, not divorced.. It we Kier-
kegaard' a aim to un8 the Socratic method $0 that thought and 
~;hl"ist1anit1 might be united. ThUG he WQuld not speculate about 
Christianity, but he would Join Cau."1stian truth to the existenoe 
of the individual. 'Dlis method Klcrkegaard considered directly 
opposed to the logical syotams of the day. ~xistence. he would 
say, in many ,,,ayts 18 the f"rustrat,lon of the lOi~ical attempt to 
Tn Ii 
t'6;;).'-~'&ren Fa~rltegaard. J:q~,;, trams. A. Oru, London, 
19ji'!. rIo. ;1;0 
. 9 Ki,';f'k?gaard, cRfu,l!&iiD& U!fiJl'2~.i·iS .P2~If'H .if1 
the Philosophical, Fragrusnts, trans. vIa tor ~wr?e, an 'liV ~n. 
son, Princeton, New JersGY, 271. 
<01 $xpla1n renlit,y. K1erkegaard bitterly carioatured the philoso-
phers of his d&y by ;Jaylng that they were men who built enONOU8 
castles but ~ere ~lemselvea contont to live in shacks nearby. 
Klerkegaard inveighed against HeDQ11e.nism not only be-
cause it lacked a non-oonceptua.liatic foundation but also beoause 
it had Ii devasultlng ef.£*ect on Chrlstian1tl".The age was one o.t 
ftdoctrin11ing,n aa he put it. .g1'er-Jthin~; had to be understood in 
a "doctriniz1n~ manner." raerkegaard lronic&llly 3Ulmlled up the 
situation well int.he f"ollo%:ling ~ifOrdS~ "Ie 13 as if Chrlstian1tl 
also t):ad been promuleated as til litt.le t:lyatem, it not quite 0,$ 
Good alGthe Ue;:;elian • • •• It is as it Christ were a professor 
and as it t.he apostles had founded a little seientl.t"'iC$oci8ty~lO 
Z~ot only did Kierkeganrd. observe the effect which He::;e .... 
litAn philosophy had on Chrl;atiiimltl. but also not.d the influence 
w1 Itch the protessors ot the un! versl tie. had on the minds of the 
public.: ft [lJ n our tune all Gtand in relat .. 1onhip with the protes-
sor" t.he Pfioteusor is t.h~ ",euu1ne Christian. And with the pro-
tessor OfAmli scientific learning. and 'with lea.rning came doubters. 
and 'tl1th learning and doubtera c·me the ec1'luti£lcally learned 
public. and then came per~ona ~ and £qD~ti •••• ttll In such a 
situation K!erkegaard c;)usidared himself a man with a mlssion. He 
I • 1 I 
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telt it was his task to correct the prevalent ways of thinking, 
i\ 
and to reinstate Christianity to its proper place+ "My only ana-
logy is Cocrates. My task is the Socratic task--to revise the 
conception ot what it means to be a Christian. I do not call my-
self a Christian (keeping the ideal free), but I can reveal the 
fact that others are still less'entitled to the name than I am112 
When Kierkegaard studied the monistic and pantheistic 
philosophies of his day, he noted that the individual had all but 
been lost in the speculative contemplation of world history~ Aa 
an antidote to this way of thinking, Kierkegaard would present 
his own qORernican Revolut&on in which the individual would be 
the supreme interest and humanity in general would evanesce into 
the shadow of an abstraction. In connection with Kierkegaardts 
reaction to the speculative philosophy and theology of his day, 
it may be noted that he also revolted against the established 
state religion, Lutheranism. In this he stirred the animosity 
of many churohman and the censure of his friends.13 
12 S_ren Kierkegaard, Attack ~eon Christenggm, trans. 
Walter Lowrie, Princeton, New Jersey, 1:9 ,2g~. 
13 For a systematized and classified presentation ot 
Klerkegaard,'s objection to the philosophy, religion, and the man-
ner of thinking of his day. the reader is referred to Jean Wahl's 
collection ot extracts from Kierkegaard's numerous J2lU'"n~~1 which 
cover the periods between leJ4 and 19J9, and between !84 and 
If!S4. Etudes Kierkegaardiennes, deuxieme ed., PariS, 1949, 455-
56a. 
10 
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From what has been seen of the person at Kiark.gaard, 
one might take him for an intellectual revolutionary who objected 
to evtlt*ytldtlg and who was basically ignorant ot the thinking ot 
man throughout the ages. But from his OHn references in the Pas'," 
script it seams that he had a fair acquaintance with the Greek 
schools ot thought. He mention. the ~lea.t'io school in connection 
with the monism of Fichte and Hegel. He speaks of Plato-a theory 
ot recollection when he treats of thought and abstraction. Other 
names such as Protagoras. Empedocles, Zeno, Plutaroh, and Origen 
find their place in his pages. Aristotle is mentioned when he 
treats of the logical nature of the Hegelian system. 
His acquaintance with the thinkers ot the Middle Ages 
seems to be almost nil. He seems to have had a general knowledge 
of the major tenets of the modern philosophers. He mentions Des-
cartes' Oo&il;.o.!..£.ii..l.!M! in connection with his discussion on 
thinking and ~xi8tif1g. The ontological argument for the exis-
t~nce ot Uod is mentioned in connection with Kant. But for the 
most part Kit.irkegaard restrict.ed his discussion ot speculative 
philosophy to that of Hegel. He made several trips to the Uni-
versity of Berlin to listen to ~le lectures. His comment on 
$chel11ng was t.tlat he was an old driveller, even though at first 
he enjoyed attending Schelling's leotures given in opposition to 
Hegelianism. 
Kierkegaard did not limit his attaok to philosophers 
10 
From what has been seen or the person ot Kierkegaard, 
one might take him for an l:ltollectual revolut.ionary who objected 
to everyth,1:tg and who was /;)a$ically isnorant of the thinklru of 
man througbout the ages. But from his o'.-.1n retcrences in the :Pos 1;0 
script it se._ that he had a. fair acquaintance with tbe Greek 
sohools of thoUSht. He mention$ the ~leat.l0 school 1n oonneotion 
\vith the monism ot t'ichte and t'l8,:;e1. He speaks of Plato' &I t.heory 
or reoollection when be treats of thought and aoetraction. Other 
names fJuch as Prot8t~Oras, J!impedocles. Zeno. Plutarch., and Orisen 
rind their place in hi$ pages. Aristotle is mentioned when he 
treats or the logical nature of the Hegelian syaten. 
His acquaintanoe w1th the thinkers ot the I'U.ddle Ages 
seems to be almost.D!l_ ae seems to have had a general knowledge 
o! the major tenets of the illodern ptll1o&oph.ers. He lnent.lona Del-
cartes' qQil~2 last .I!iIi 1n connection with hia discusslon on 
thlnking ~il.nd existing. 'lbe ontological IU'gument for tn& axis-
t<.\:uce of: God 1s montioned in connEu)tion with Kant. But for the 
most, part Kierkegaal"d restricted his discussion of speculative 
philosophy t.o that of Be~$l. He made several torii'S to the Un!-
v&rs1.ty of Berlin to listen to che lectuns. His COrmilent on 
$o:08111n& was that he was lin old driveller, even though at first 
he enjoyed. att~ndina Jchelling' 8 lectur.s~~i".n in opposition to 
Hetlellanislfh 
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"I 
and theologians as such, but he even included in his total war-
r.;u"'o :11 $ own bishop. 
nera in Do~rk tho Hep;elians have several times bet!tn on the 
warpath~ especiall, alter Bishop ll1 yn.ter, t.o t~ain the bril-
l iant vic tory of a;?eCulf;l tl Vf;\ thou:~ht.. Blshop r>lyna~l" has 
more than once become a vanquisbed standl)oint, though he 
aea, to be doing very well, and it is rather to b$ teared 
t.hat the tremendous exertion incident to the winning ot.the 
victory has been too iAluoh Co;',, the u..t}v~nqu!$hed vletot's.J.4 
The abov$ cen:lure Kl11rk0gaard cUNcted ,\'~ls bIshop 
because hQ tried to reconcile Chr1$tlQnity with 8:t)eculatlve liege-
liania:'t.t. In thtt ml~t ot th\~ I)h11o£;)()})h1cal ilnd th'301oJloal fer-
" 
mentat.ion propur to hi$ ti~~.\ Ki"~.t"kegaElrd set h1t1sl)lt ehe task 
ot up3ett.i~ the 'dhale madam trend at 't4'lnueht. Alon. h$ would 
opposelfthe 3Y3tQmi'f of tll$ th~i:;tlliilns and any othtU''' )051 ti1an which 
attack ',liith 111:11ectics, but his di·:llectics\I;ould not be the neo"s-
sary evolution of 'the Ide.at. :~(;'t.ber his dialectio wO~41d ha·,. its 
roota in ~xi3tel.'loe. j He 'f,,,ould n.ot be conOr~H"'n:)d ,,\lith thG intricate 
point:.; of dogmatiC thlitoloa;y. but he ·WOuld.3r:;),P~Hl::d:&e the Indi vi .... 
dunl ,'iuol t:le lnd i vidual' s:~:;ersonal relation 1;0 a.n ·all ... lmport,:imt 
tru:th. His every tlncier.l;'fOl'" lvoi.1.1d b:::, to hring a $olution to his 
,"0 bi'COffi$ .a :::?u·l~t,j.an.) lbe followi:l'\O" three ohawters , .~ . 
/ ' 
~roblem as Ki,;ii:rltegaa:;~d $aw i t~n.d &nswered it. 
R I t. tU 
CHAPTER II 
KI~RKEQAAaDt S ri~OBL~iJ HO'w '.L'O BECORB A ClmI~YrIAN 
To understand the philosophical thought of men like Ber-
nard of C1airvaux, Pascal, or Saint Augustine, one must realize 
that the problem which confronted them was a religious one. Kiar-
kegaard likewise had a. religious problem.l Kierkegaard states 
his problem in the following passage. 
Here is a literary productivity, whose total idea is-~ 
the problem of becoming a Ohristian. • •• But the author 
has thoroughly understood from the beginning, and consistent-
ly developed the consequences ot the fact that the situation 
is in Christendom. • •• To become a Christian in Christen-
dom Is tantamount either to becoming what one already is, and 
this requires reflection in the direction 'of i'mv-srdness and 
subjectivity, or else it means to be treed first from the 
grip of lllusion. and this c.ennot be done without renection. 
The problem 1st b~ing in a oertain sense a Christian, to be-
come a Christian.Z 
Kierkegnnrd also states his problem (!learly in the in-
~roduction to the Po.stscript{. 
The objective problem consIsts of an inquiry into the 
truth ot Christianity. The subjective problem ~oncerns the 
relationship of tee individual to Christianity.) To put it 
I 
1 Etienne Gilson, Beinli and 3QmS Philoso"tlerB, Toron-
"'0, 1949, 142. II - - - , 
2 ~oren Kierkegaard • ..Ib.!. POil':\t .2l ~iew. trans, Walter 
L.!owrie, 0xford, 1939, }+2-43. 
12 
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simply: How may I. Johannes Olimacus, participate in the 
happiness pro~ised by Christianity? The problem concerns 
myself alone.) 
/ In the solution ot this problem in Christendom, the 
Christendom in which he lived, Kierkegaard encountered confusion. 
The Hegellans accounted for most ot this confusion; it consisted 
in believing that to be a Christian was to know Christianity, and 
that there was a system, Ii speculation, or a §W!gHta[ knowledge 
through which it was po. sible to become a Christlan.J+ To remove 
this contusion, Kierkegaard had first to investigate speculative 
philosophy which to him was in the main Hegellan philosophy.' ,i 
" 
) Kierkegaard, P28~lcr12t, 20. 
4 Gilson, !'It!!, .I.W! !2e.! PhiiosQPhetl. 142.143. 
; In his article -the Mind or Kierke~ard' The Attack 
Upon Hegelianls.,- publiSh.! in the ~2ee£D Sia22D• XXVI, March. 1949. 22), n •• James Collins rna es co en~n these word., 
The important qualification "Hegelian" should be attached to each 
of these terms (v,g_. philosophy, logiC; reason, and metaphysics]. 
Hence I cannot entirely agree with J. Wahl (Etudes k1erkegaar-
diennes (ParisJ 1938) pp. 174-175) that Kierkegaard's attack upon idealistic philosophy is formally extended into a repudiation of 
~ll philosophy. Only when it pretends to be all-inclusive on the 
basis ot identity between thought and being does philosophy tall 
~nder Kierkegaardts condemnation. But since, aside from Aris-
totle, he was unacquainted with any definite philosophy free from 
~ cla1m to selt-sufficiency, lierkegaard is not oareful enough in 
~istinguishing between Hegelian p'lilosophy and other possible 
types ot philosophy. That there can be non-idealistic ways of 
seeking a systematic philosophical outlook is rightly stressed by 
p. Weiss. in oppOSition to both Hegel and Kierkegaard (so tar as 
the latter leave some room for misunderstanding by his omission): 
"Existen. and Heyel!- Phil.oSOPhY and Phenomenological Researeh, ifIll (Dec., 1947/, G06-16. 
14 
I1ThiatherelOre beoame my resolve. to disoover where the misunder-
standing lies between speculative philosophy and Chrlstlanlty.ff6 ! ) 
It was not long berore Klerkegaard concluded that tor 
his poobl .. the two, Christianity and speculative philosophy. wer. 
irreconcilable. He soon let 100S8 one or the severest attacks 
tha t H.![.~ellan philosophy was to. undergo 1n 1 ta day or in more re-
cent times. Klerkegaard's barbed condemnation or He(~el1an specu-
lative phllosophy as the answer to his problem flowed with cunnl~ 
irony and stinging satire. 
Speculat.ive philosophy achieves the triumph or understanding 
Christianity entire· but it is to be noted that it does not 
underatand 1n a Christlan manner, but speculatively, whioh 
is precisely a misunderstanding, sinoe Christianity 1s the 
very opposite or speculation.T-
But wha't other presupposition can, generally spe"klng, C01ne 
into question for the so-called Christian philosophy but thai 
Christianity is t.be precis. opposite of speculation, that it 
1s the f,QiraculouG, the absurd, a challenge to the individual 
to ex.1st in it! and notd to waste his time by trying to under-
stand it specu atively.Q 
The at~1tude ot Kierkegaard reflected in ~le above paa-
sa4:~. 1s one 11ke that or the Imitation ot Christ when it says, "1 
would rather feel coepunction. than define It.n9 To exist .s a 
Christian rather than detine dogma was Klerkegaard'. concern • 
... II 
6 Klerkegaard, PQs¥lcr~Ri, 216. 
7 l!Wt., 243. 
8~'f ))S. See also 193-195. 
9 Th0JU8 A Kemp'., .Dla 'g,AQI&D& .9.t Ctu:j!1i, I, 1, J. 
1, 
The following passage trom K1erkegaard clarif1e. hl. 
stand on the problem ot becoklng a Christian. Again the 8ubjeo. 
tive point at view must be kept in mind. r For Klerkegaard it 18 
the problem or the individual relating himself to Christianity, 
rather than the iruUvldual having 8 profound knowledge ot objec-
tive truths ot Christianity. 
The problem 1s relevant to Christianity. Less problematical. 
1y 1n the formot a dissertatiOn! it might be viewed a8 in-
volvIng t.he apologetic presuppos tions for falthl the approx-imation. leading toward faith, the quantitative ntreduction 
to the decision ot faith. That which aceOrdlnglI would h.". 
to be treated would be a multitude ot cons1derat ona, whicb 
are, or were once dealt with by theologians in an introduo-
tory discipline. in the introduction to dogmatics. and In 
apologetics. But in order to avoid contu.ion, it is at once 
necessary to recall that ou.t treatment ot the prabl_ does 
not raise the question ot the truth ot Christianity. It 
merely deala with ~le que'tion ot the indiv1dual's relation-
ship to Ohristianity. It haa nothing to do with the sy.te-
matic leal ot the personally indifferent individual to ar-
range the truths of Christianity in paragraphs; 1t deal, witt 
the cone.mot the infinitely interafted indlvldual tor his 
own relationship to such a doctrine. 0 
In the above passage .K1erkegaard speol.rles clearly that 
tnt" pro1.11_ or Christianity is not one ot objectivity, one ot 
\ 
measuring the truth ot Chrlst1an1ty~ The truth or Chr16tlanity h. 
take. tor granted. To measure thle truth, 1n Klcrkeg8.ard t s opin-
ion would be the approach ot the speculative philosopher_r 
'rom the speculative point ot view, Christianity is viewed a 
an historical phonomenon. 'lbe problem or its truth theretor. 
becomes the problem ot so interpeutetrating it with thought, 
J1'hat Christianity at last reveals itself 8S the ete.mal trut.& 
'1'1'18 specula ti ve approach t.o the problem is characterized by 
I d J I I 
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one excellent trait: it has no presur>posltlons. It pro-
ceeds from nothing, it ~5sumes nothing as given. it begs no 
postulates. Bere then we may be sure ot avoidIng such pre-
suppos! tiona as were met wi til in the preceding. 
lind yet, sO::let?lng 18 after all lUJsumed: ChristIanity 
is assumed as given. Alas a.nd alack' philosophy 1s alto-
~ether tooa polite. How 8tran~e Is the way ot the world' 
unce it was the risk ot his 11£. that a man dared to protesa 
himself a Christian; now it i8 to make10neselt suspect to 
venture doubt that one is a Christian. J. 
K1erkeg£iard goes at great length in his wr1 tinge to M-
tlrl~e the explanation 01" Christianity according to apeculatlve 
philosophy, or more properly, according to Hegelian philosophy, 
as may be ~~(" thered trOll the tone ot 'the above pas_g.. The prob-
lam ot Kl~rk.gaard was an ethical one, Ii rell,ziou8 one \'ihiCh con-
cern. the reaatlonshlp of the individual to Christianity, Specu-
lative philosopby. l,mdeZ"et.ood as a phIlosophy with no root. in 
real! t1 independent ot out though't, cannot answer his probl_. 
which ooncerns the exist.ing individual. Speaking ot the PlatoniC 
thElJory ot recollection, he puts it this way_ 
The recollection-principle belongs to speculative philoso-
phy lind recollectlon 18 bllWilnence, and speculatively- and 
et~mally there is no p~l,radox. But t.be difficulty 1$ tbat 
no human belof is speoulative prl11oaopby; the speculative 
philo$opher h flselt is an exlating individual, subjec' to 
the claims that exl.ettr;nce make. upon him. 11:u'!tr8 i8 no merit 
in torgetting 'Chis, but a great merit Inl~olding it fast. 
and t.,h1s 1s precisely what Socrates did. 
11 ~., 49. 
12 Ibid., 184-1S" see note. 
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TIl& reference to Socrates in the above passage is typi-
cal of many others which Kierkegaard made to the early Greek phi-
losopher.. For Kierkegaard. Socrates was the ethical philosopher, 
and the model ot his own philosophizing.. Kierkegaard likened 
Socrates to a lover.. The early Greek did not merely know and 
teach wisdom, but he was in love with wisdom. Just as the true 
. 
lover is not one who knows much about love but does not actually 
love, so Socrates was not one who merely knew about wisdom, but 
he was the very love of wisdom walking around the streets and 
places of Athens.. Klerkegaard compared himself to Socrates not 
in wisdom but in the manner of PhilOSOPhiSIng./ To be at Christian 
did not mean to have an objective knowledge of Christianity but 
to be subjectively a Christian.. Since the problem ot becoming a 
Christian is one of the individual. ot the subject, and not one 
ot objectivity, Kierkegaard rejects the objeetive explanation ot 
it. 
Objectively, what it is to become a Christian is defined in 
the following ways A Christian is one who accepts the doc-
trine ot Christianity. But if it is the doctrine which i8 
to decide in the last resort whether one is a Christian, 
then instantly attention is directed outward, in order to 
learn to know in the minutest detail what the doctrine ot 
Christianity is, because this indeed is to decidt, nO~iwhat 
Christianity is, but whether I am a Christian •••• [IJn the 
end the decision whereby one becomes a Christian is relega-
ted to oblivion.1) 
Once Kierkegaard has established for himself that Chris-
tianity has little in common with the objective standpoint, he 
1) Ibid •• '31. 
1~ 
\ 
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states what Christianity 1s trom the subject.ive standpoint_I 
ffChristianity is spirit, spirit is inwtlrdn&ss, inwardne.8 18 aub-
jeetivlty, subjectivity is essentIally passion, and 1n 1\& maxi-
mum an infinite personal, pasaionate intereat 1n oneta eternal 
happlnes •• "14 Now that Kierkegaard has removed Christianity trom 
the objective solution and plaee'd it on the ground ot subjeoti-
vity, he desoribes more specifically the nature or the subjecti-
vity. "Subjectivity cu~nlnates In passion, Christianity is the 
paradox. paradox and palaion are a mutual ri t. and thepaNdox 11 
altogether suited to one i:/hose situat.ion ie. to be in the extrem-
ity ot existence."lS 
In the above quotation the keynote or all Kierkegaard" 
thoufSht i fa sounded. The Alcibiadean lever with which he over-
threw the mass ot Her';ellan thoUi~ht will now lay open his problem 
and prepare the way or solution. That leyer, that keynote i8 
6;Slstln«il./ 
Speoify1ng more clearly the nature ot existence, lier-
kegaard claims that nOhrlstlanl ty i8 not a doctrine but an e:.da-
tential communication expressing an existential contradlction."16 
To one asking what the nature or this contradicttlon ia, Kierke-
eaarei replies, "The existential contrad1ction proposed by Chris-
lit lJWt., 1). 
1, 
16 
Ibid,_, 206. 
lbid., ))9. also 14, 290, 342. 49'. 497, 499. SOl. 
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tlan! ty 1. the one I have sought to f'onaulate 1n the problem of 
an eternal happiness decided in time by a relationship to 80m •• 
thing historioal."l? This .'ill'. lU1tSU'ic" 'S the absolute 
paradox. "The paradox consiats p!"lncipally in the taot that God, 
the Eternal, came into ex! stenee 1n time as It particular un. "la 
In the '£111&.0\1 Kierkegaard aay •• "But the paradox unites the 
. 
contradictori8. and 1 s the hlstorlcal made eternal and the eter-
nal made historical. gveryont who understands the paradox dil. 
ferently may keep the honor ot having explained it, lIIt.lch honor 
he won by not beIng content to understand It.w19 The importance 
ot this paradox Klerkegaard seta oft In the following quotation. 
"The characteristic mark ot Christianity is the paradox, the ao. 
8oluteparadox.ff20 The paradox takes ita existential importa.nce 
from its relation to the individual. wThe par~dox is altogether 
snlit.d to one whose situation 1s to be in the: extremity ot exis-
tence.-21 1be significance at this relation Kierkegaard bring. 
out in the following passa,e. 
In (tomparilOD with thie direction toward the abGOlute . .Hl.a, 
any and every .... sult, even it it were the realisation 0ltJii 
moat glorious laney bom in awllhlng individual'. head, or 
....... ---..... ,{,......IP! ... ~hi .. 4d _, 340, 8110 )23. 3)0, )4? l' ~ .. 52S, also 529. 
19 KlarkegaoN, lhl*QIQe!l~ lalUnti. trane. David 
F. Svenson. Princeton, Rew Jers81, 19W, ,rand 79. In ttl.!. book 
Kle.-kegattN devote. an entire chapt.er to the Absolute Paradox. 
20 Klerk.gllull'd. frUUiIlE'Rx. 4~O 
u leW., 206. 
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in a poe\'s creative imagination. constitutes an absolute 
loss. The striving individual is better otf if he thrusts 
it aside and says: "No, thanks, lIt me rather keep my rela-
tionship to the absolute ~elql."22 
Klarkegaard continues on, giving a further description 
of this relationship whereby we become a Christian. "Subjective-
ly, what it is to become a Christian is defined thus: The decision 
liea in the subject. The appropriation is the paradoxical inward-
ness which is specifically different from all other inwardness.,,23 
The 2\hlt ,nwamU!11 to which Kierkegaard refers might be taken t!l8 
that in the language ot a Hegelian. It is the inwardness which!s 
found in the third sphere of existence in f;e;ligiougDt!!!. It is 
a type ot faith which might be rmd even by a pagan through "selt. 
annihilation" before the deity. A further study of this inward-
ness will be treated in chapter four ot this thesis. But to em-
phasise the nature ot the inwardness of pure abstractions, Kiar-
kegaard asserts: ftThe thing of being a Christian is not determined 
by the what of Christianity. but by the hQ'f' of' the Christian. Thill 
h2! can only correspond with one thing, the absolute paradox.,,24 
Kierkegaard adds: 
.... the appropriation by which a Christian is a Ohriatian 
must be so specific that it cannot be confused with anything 
else. One defines the thing ot becoming and being a Christian 
22 l.2,W.- , 356, also 46Et, ;06, 515. 
23 Ibid. , 540, also 191. ;39. 
24 ~., 540. 
S;ren A., 1.1erkegaard, who was considered by many as 
juat another Prot.stant theologian ot the nineteenth oentury, was 
not until recently deemed worthy ot muob philosophic study by 
. 
proteaa1onal philosophers. 'orothe .. a, 11erkegaard. was urely 
another modem tad nor wa_ he studied eerioualy as were some oE 
hi. Oerman phllosophio pred:ecesaora. But within the paat t.an 
y •• r8, the works at tbia hitherto unlmown author have been 
apread1ng out. trOll their humble origin in Copenhagen. Denmark by 
way ot 'rencb, Italian, aeman. and Engllab translations. 
11erkegaard 18 ot interest both trom a philosophic and 
a theological point ot vlev. Philosophioally, be 18 now studied 
in connectlon with the prasent movement called "existentialism." 
He has been called the lather ot modem existentialism. His the-
oriel bring to view such problems as the knowledge or reality. 
the validity ot objective truth, and the queation ot existenoe. 
He is a key figure ot tne nineteenth century as a .l"e"1110118 re-
actionary to the systematic apeoulative philo.cpoy ot Hegel. 
Theologically, Kierkegnard 1s oZ concern to one inter-
ate<! in the Ll}theran notion of tal th as 1 t was proposed in the 
ay when Hege11an philosophy had all but swallowed up Lutheranism. 
1y 
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not objectively by the ~ ot the dOQtrine, nor subjective-
ly by appropria tion, not"""by what baa gone on 1.n the lndl vi-
dual. but by what the illdividual bas Wlder~~one= ••• there 
1. needed a spocific definition ot inwardness and appropria-
tion whereby the witness ot the $plrlt in the Individual 1s 
distinguIshed 2~ all other universally defined actiy1ty ot 
spirit in man. :> 
In the above text, Kierkegaard explains what he mean. bJ 
appropriation ae proper to the activity or becoming a Christian. 
It is distinct from all other appropriation such a IS that which i8 
pro ;:01'" to knowledge by which one atter a t ashion ttbeoomes other 
thing; •• " IUs appropriation 18 the volItional activity by which 
one a$S~. moral porsonallty. In becoming a Christian, appro-
priation tor Klerkogaard 18 the repeat.ed decisions by which one 
makes himself other than he lit by becoming related to the Abso-
lute Paradox. Th1s appropriation of which Klerk$gaard apeaka 1a 
personal. It pertains to. the individual 1n hia queat to become a 
Christian. The 1 t',;dl vlduallatlc aapect ot this app1"'Opl"iatJ.on 1. 
brought out in lIhe following worda of Klerkegaard. 
Ohriatlanlty propos •• to endow the individual with an eternal 
bappinG •• 'Whioh lanot distributed wholenl., but only to en. 
individual at a tble. Though Christianity assume. that til ... 
inherea 1n the subjectivity ot the individual, as being the 
potent.iality ot the appropriation ot good, the possibility 
tor 1t$ acoeptance, 1 ••• , by volitional concentration on the 
ab801ute t.elos in the highest degree , it does not .as1.l.lne 
that the subJeotivity 1s immediately ready tor such aocep-
t.ance •••• It 1. subjeotivity that Chrletianlty 11 conOl!lDlld 
with and it is only in 8u.bject.ivity that its truth e:d..te.l7 
II • I .. 
25 Ibid., 539. 
26 This insert 18 taken trom the i!211(IQr12\, p.)S). 
27 Kierkegaard, f2!lIs£&R~' 116, also 5)9. 
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Kierkegaard leaves no doubt that his problem or becom-
ing a Christian is one of subjectivity. It i8 in this subjectivitv 
alone that truth is found. It is not objective truth \ihlch i& 
known. but it is subjective truth which 1& lived. Jolivet comments 
on Kierkegaard) s consideration ot truth. In his COllWent, he li-
kens this subjective truth to truth as it was in Christ, a 11t .. -
. 
It has been shol!\ll that KlerkegMrd rejects the epeoula-
tiY. or Hege11an way ;.,8 the solution to the problem ot becordng a 
Christian. Likewise he rejects the objective vay, or \~y ot abw 
strBot thought which gives Oflly a specular knowledge of reality 
as the solution to his problem. It i. 1n $ubjectiv1ty, one dle-
tinct trom all other subjoctivity euch as 18 found 1n thought, 
that l{ierkegaard flnds the 801ution to hi8 problem. In this aul>-
j'sct.iY1ty ot inwardness one finds t.ruth. '.the rollowing chapter 
will. lsive Klerkegaard' $ vlows on subJect1 'lit.! and truth. 
I 11M I bI 
aa Regis Jol1vet ID¥~qugt;'9f.l. X'ltlSi!58Hmt Abbaye 
paint Wandrl11e, 194'. 10)1 Agans oute, lodtegaa~ prores.e.t;..11 
qu t il ~'" a de verite :9our 1 f hOlume que dans 18 t subjecti vi tt.1, , 
C t eat-a-d ire que. loin de d iluer le mol dans 1 tin t.emoorel de 1a p~n5e, ~bj.ctiv. et o.bstra1te. la philosoph!e dolt m\apporter un. 
verlte a 14Quel18 mon ~tr~ individual puis" eommuniert que 1e 
comprendrs,. do~ t eonduire a l' a:,ir. QU t 11 ne s.aura1 t su.rtire de / &6-
voir la veritA, mals qultl Importe avant tout dtetre dans la ve-
rite. 11 nty a de v'rlte (Jour l'indlv1du qu'en tant qu t ll 14 pr<J!o 
duit 1\1.1 ... ome en agi8aant." ~~n srret, ltet.re "de 18 veri;e ntest 
pas le r.doublaroen~ direct de l' etre rapports a' 1& pensee. Non, 
l'etre de 1a verite a son redoubl6ln~nt en toii en mol. ~n lui, de sort. que ta vie t 14 m1enna, ls a1.nne, dJ;jns t effort 0\1 el18 a t _ 
ai:'proeho, est l'atN de 18 v'rite, comme 1a verite rut dan. 18 
Christ una rlJi. oar i1 rut 1. verlte. f"utrerlllilnt d1t, je ne con. 
nais en verIii que lorsqu'elle devient vie en mol.-
CHAPTER III 
OBJECTIVITY AND SUBJECTIVITY 
For 11erkegaard. as has been seen, the matter ot becom-
ing a Christian is an existential problem. It is one of subjec-
tivity, A further analysis of the nature of this subjeotivity 1. 
needed. Kierkegaard explains it by contrasting it with objecti-
vity" 
Objectively the interest is focussed merely on the thought-
content, subjectively on the inwardness. At its maximum 
this ffhowH is the passion at the infinite. and the passion 
of the infinite is the truth. But the passion ot the infi-
nite is precisely subjectivity, a nd thus subjectivity be .. 
comes the truth. Objectively there is no infinite decisive-
ness, and hence it is objectively in order to annul the dit-
ferenee between good and evil. together with the principle 
at contradiction, and therewith also ~he intinite ditferenoe 
between the true and the talse. Only in SUbjectivity is 
there decisiveness, to seek objectivity is to be in error.l 
Kierkegaard distinguishes here two kinds ot truth, sub-
jective and objective. If one 1s to beCOMe a Christian, he cannot 
be indifterent to subjective truth and must be indifferent to ob-
jective truth since it prescinds from individual existence. Sub-
jective truth is ethical and must be liYed and willed by decisive-
ness. Objeetlve truth in itself is only in the intellectualcrder 
1 Kierkegaard, P2stsctipt, 1~1, also 116, 173. 176,537. 
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as knowledge, and is a mere approximation to reality. It has no 
reference to the ethical subject, nor doe a it in any way require 
decisiveness or willing. ',,'hen Kierkegaard states that objective 
knowledge annuls the difference between good and evil, the prin-
ciple ot contradiction, and the infinite difference between the 
true and the talse, he seems to mean that the validity at the 
principle of contradiction, ot good and evil, at truth and falsity 
rests on an exIstential basis. The principle of contradiction is 
enunciated in terms of being and ot!!ll' Similarly the subjec-
tive aspect of good and evil rests upon the existing subject or 
individual in his choices of thatvlhich 1s objectively good or 
evil. Likewise. the living of truth requires an existing subject. 
Furthermore, a ccording to Klerkegaard, "the objectivity 
. 
which has come into being 1. from the subjective point of view 
at most, either a n hypothesis or an a.pproximation. because all 
eternal decisiveness is rooted in subjectivity,"2 
The above pa.ssage contains three points which are ot 
cardinal importance in the phIlosophy ot Kierkegf,E rd. The first 
or these points is that tlall decisiveness is rooted in subjecti-
vity." This pOint of subjectivity must be kept in mind at all 
times when reading Kierkegaard. It is a term which reflects Kier-
kegaardfs rebellion against all systematie philosophy, It is e8-
2 Kierkegaard, PQst§criRt, 173, also 170, 509. 
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'" sential to his theory ot knowledge, and it is basic to his con-
cept of faith. 
The second point is that ot ~approximatlon." Klarke. 
geard considered objective knowledge and objective truth as 
merely an approximation to the truth ot reality. lbe reason for 
this, according to Kier~egaard'8 way of thinking. is that objec-
tive knowledge as such does not take acoount ot the human knower 
who must affirm the truth according to his own situation in exis-
tenoe, nor does objective knowledge reach an understanding ot the 
thing after its own mode of being,. a subject exercising exis. 
tence in its own right. Objective knowledge presoindl trom exis-
tence. Or a8 Kierkegaard would have it. objective knowledge ex-
cludes existenoe.) 
Thirdly, objective knowledge is "hypothetical" acoor-
ding to Klerkegaard in that 1 t does not c'~~ncern any partioular 
subject but merely a fictitious subject-in-general. Since the 
subject.in-general is not an existing subject, it is hypotheti-
ca1.4 
Since knowledge which merely approximates reality or 
~hich stands on a hypothetiC basis is not related to existence, 
it would be a matter of indifference for Kierkegaard as a solu-
J For further discussion of the aspect of truth In 
Kierkegaard, see James Collins, tfThree Kierkegaardian Problems: 
'llhe ,Meaning of Existence," '£hI m 3gho\a!td:9ism, nII, July, 
~94e, 376. 
4 Swenson, ~omethin' ~boHt K&erkegaa£s, 10). 
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'" tion to his problem. Only knowledge whose relation to existence 
is essential, ia essential kno\11l1edge for Kierkegaard. The know-
ledge which has validity for Kierkegaard is that which 1s dirae-
ly related to the existing subject in the practical order. 
For Kierkegaard, then. subjectivity is the truth. "Only 
in subjectivity is there decisiveness •••• It is the passion 
of the infinite that is the decisive factor and not its content, 
for its content is precisely itself. In this Uls.nner subjectivity 
and the subjective 'how' conttitute the truth. tt5 
In the above passage, Klerkega.ard mentions the term !J.I. ... 
cisiveness. It is read many times in his pages, and should be no-
ted as a caution to those who might misinterpret Kierkegaardts 
concept of subjectivity. Clearly it is not the subjectivity of 
the "l-~-I" of F1chte. h"hiCh he condemns.6 In general. the sub-
jectivity of Kierkega,ard had little in common wi1"h the solipsis-
tic egos which emerged from the conceptualistic theories ot cog-
nition prevalent in the nineteenth century. These he rejected 
because they gave a priority of thought over being. Attempting 
to go beyond the epistemological dilemma between idealism and em-
piriCism, he gave moral and religious sense to his term, It hi. 
;whought were to be placed in any tradition, it would better fit 
into that ot St. Augustine, Kierkegaard well would ascribe to the 
5 Kierkegaard, P2st!cr!i~. 19l, also 182-183, 226. 
6 ~bia., 107. 108, 176-177, 179. 
-
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'" proposition: is il1tar1o~ heroine habi,ta3t ver;J;:¥C\13. A man' a sub-
jectivity in this sense is his personal, inward condition in re-
spect to the moral law and religious life, a phase of reality 
which is not open to scientific determination. In this sense, 
existential knowledce muot be subjective.? 
In the following pass«ge, KlerkegaE\rd shows his stand 
on the dile~~s proposed to him be idealism and empiricism. 
ylhether truth is defined more empirically as the conformity 
ot thought and being, or More idealistically as the confor-
mity of being \t.1.th thought, it is, in either case. important 
carefully to note what is meant by being. • • • 11' being in 
the two indicated definitions! is 'u,nderstood as. empirical 
being, truth is at once transformed into a d!Sidera£~, and 
everythinr; must be understood in terms of becomIng.; or the 
empirical object is unfinished and the existing cognitive 
spirit itself is in process of becoming. Taus the truth be-
comes an approximation whose beginning cannot be posited ab-
solutelYt precisely because the conclusion is lacking, the 
effect 01" which is retro-aetive. \'ihenever a beginning is 
made, on the other hand, unless through being awarE' of thiS, 
theprocedure stamps itsel£ as arbitrary, such a bE;ginning 
is nct the consequence of an immanent movement of thought 
but it is effected through a resolution of the will, easen-
totally in the strength of faith. That the knowing spirit I. 
an existing individual spirit and that every human being is 
sueh an anti ty existing for himself is a tr'uth I cannot too 
often repeat. • • • But if there is any lawful and honest 
manner in which I could be helped into becoming something 
extraordinary like the pure I-am-l tor example, I always 
stand ready gratefll.11y to accept the gift and the benef'ac-
tion. But if it can only be done in the manner indicated, 
by Mying .!,!.Ih Iwe?, iU:!1 kokolornm, or by tying a string 
around thelitt e lnger, ':jnd then 1;\1'1e1'1 the moon i8 full, 
hiding it in some secret place--in that caseSI prefer to re-
main what I am, a poor existing human being. 
7 For a similar explanation ot Kierkegaard's subjecti-
vism see Collind I'tThe Meaning ot Existence," 179. and Haecker, siren Kl!r~!&al .• 27. ' 
8 Kierkegaard, POjir't$cr;~$:.169-170. 
Th' above passage contains Kierkegaard's rejection or 
empirical knowledge as an adequate road to reality. In this be 
shows his skepticism. rejecting empirical k:loNladge as an ade .... 
l'1uate representation of reality bocause everything is 1n the 
process of becoming. The conceptualism of the Heg;elians, whose 
system requires a legerdemain, !!a. !!!!,9t!1 kgko40tY!, to 
start the process of movement,he like'wise rejects with irony. 
Rejecting the beginning ot movement as the consequence ot an im-
manent movement of thought, Kierkegaard posits a resolution of 
the will, "essentially in the strength of faith," as the lever 
which gives J'llOVement to reality. Here one can see a reflection 
of Kierkegaard's religious background. one in which faith unsup-
ported by reason was of cardinal importance. 1i:ore will be said 
of faith in Kierkegaard in the following chapter. 
It is sufficient'to note here that in the term A~i~Q 
K1erkegaard shows himself as the religious writer, the moralist. , 
For him truth is practical, always unfinished, and essentially 
paradoxical. This truth is concerned with the individual human 
existent and his self-develop~ent rather than with general laws 
nd natures. Subjective reflection is ordained to a ,practioal 
peration--to the cultivation of the self in its free relations 
ith God. Because human existence and its potentialities are re-
c-arded in relation to the infinite God, they can never be treated 
s baing in a sta.te of equilibrium and rOlmded-off completion. 
Because the individual is related to an infinite God, his existel'U) 
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his continual striving will never be completo. Henee Kierke. 
gaard excludes the possibility or an existential system in con-
trast \ilth the loglca.l system ot Hegel. 
System and finality are pretty much one and the same, 80 
much 80 that it the system 18 not einlshed, there i8 no sys-
tem.9 ••• A logical .x.tem 1a possible; and existential 
syatem 1s Impos8ible.J.VV •• Nothing must then be incorpora-
ted in a logical ayatem that baa Qny illat.ion to existence, 
that is not indifferent to existence. 
In contraat to tlle cloNd system ot the logicians, Kiel'l 
kegaard posits the ideal ot the existing individual. nTb. ideal 
ot a persistent striving expre •••• the existing subject's ethical 
view ot 11te.-12 
Thus tar Kicrkegaard. has explained hlo C onoeptlon of 
objeotivity as contrasted with subjectivity. He haa discarded 
the objective way as the way ot truth because it i8 hypothetical 
and mer,,~ly an approximation to reall ty. lie haa presented two ex-
tremes in the explanation or truth, the idealistic and the empi-
riC, and haa i::iven his own explanation from the ethical stand-
point-that truth liea in subjectlvit.y. The following pa.uge 
• 
9 Klerkegaard, f91~lir'Q¥1 9S. 
10 lla.9... 99. 
11 ,11&£1., 100. 
12 lh1d.. 110. Furt.her references to "The System" as 
viewed by K1eriiiiard may be round in the disoussions of the tol-
lowing work.SWahl, ~!'1'f K't:l'~.'!D91I.t 2111 Haecker, ~ lU.erkEt&aard, 22, 2810 na, e· 1'1 ng of" Qi,stence," J7~ 
dIlson, 51", ial ~ fh1&'S6QQb"£I. 148. 
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tty. But pure thcught is stUl a third medium, quite recent. 
ly discovered. It therefore begin!l as the saying 1., after 
the most. ex.'1austivG abstraction, ','he relation which ab-
stract thought still sustains to that trom \IA11ch it abatraotl 
18 eomething which pure thought innocently or thoughtlesS1I 
ignores, Here is rest tor every doubt. here Is the eterna 
p,0sitlve truth, and whatever else one trla:y be pleased to MY_ 
that 1St pure thought 1. a phantom. It the Hegellan l>hl1o-
sophy has emancipated itself from every presuPlfosition, it 
haa won this freedom by means ot on. lunatic postulate. the 
initial transition to pure'thougnt.1; 
From the above matter it anould be noted that K!erke-
gaard does not apeak ot abstract knowledge as he doe. ot nap.ou. 
lacive" philosophy. As shall be seen later 1n the treatment on 
faith. abstract thought, which is the objective way or whioh K1ep.. 
kegaaN speaka, ultima.tely will not be valid as a .:olution to hi. 
$xist.ential problem. But it haa some value in that it presents 
possibility, the possibility ot reality. The actuality ot this 
poss.1bility 1s round 1n existential thought, in the relat,lng ot 
the individual subject to the truth or Christianity_ Speaking or 
reali ty frOUl the ethical standr>oint, Xierkegaard explains why ab-
stract thought cannot explain the existential problem. 
Abstract thought e.braces the poasible, either the preceding 
or the subsequent pos8fbili t1; pure thought is phantom. The 
real subject is not the COi~nitiv. ~ .. ubject, since in knowing 
he 1I0ves the the $phere or the p~l.aibl.l the real 8ubject 1s 
the e thlcall,. exi$tini~ subject. An a b$tract thinker exist. 
to be :.lure. but this tact 18 1"'ath • .,. a s,atire on him than 
otherwise. For an abstract thinker to try to prove bi. ex-
istence by the tact th.ea t he t.hlnk8! 18 a curious contradic-
tion; tor 1n the degree that he th nka abstractly be abstrcta 
from his own exi8tence. • • • But the aot or abstraction 
neverthele.8 becomes a strange sort of proof tor his exi .... 
tence, since it it auce.ded entirely his exiatence would 
v 
To read K1$rkegaard without an insight. into his lite 
and background merely adds contuuion to bewilderment. To read 
Kierkeeaard without patiently understanding his purpose or the 
meaning he applle. to terms is likewise befuddling. Kierkegaard 
must be read not only in the 11~ht ot what one understands by the 
terms employed but with some acquaintance w1th the philosophy 
which Kiorkegaard had been taught, and wi t.h an understanding of 
the modification of meaning which he gave to t$~S already common 
in German philosophy. 
Hot only must one be acquainted with the terminology in 
Kledcegaard, but also with the way in which the various work. 
were written. His W'orks are mainly divided into thr •• types, the 
e sthotl0, philosophical, nnd rell/~lol.u" 1".. esthet.ic works are 
mainly imaginative. The first of this series, SilitU!E /,2£., which 
feii1;ued t.o be wrltt;el'l by Victor iremlta, presents two views ot 
human lite. The one view 1s represented by the Youth, and 1t 1. 
eathetic and amoral. The second view 1a represented in the worda 
ot Judge Wilhelm, and this view is the ethioal viewpoint. or the 
ptll1o$ophioal worka the F,aman's and the £g!l$4ugilli \lDIS!sntWa 
Postscript are moat representative. They contain tbe moat philo-
sophical prlUJllnta tion ot Kiarkegaarc:l t 8 baaic thOU&Jht and have 
been uud as the priml1lry aources ot this thesis. The §d&tx1o.I 
Discours •• I' C.b£~!~iIQ Q&sSSHK!II. and the PgiDl Sot .u.a l2t !l 
ttlork AI AD. AY'tib2E are "1'"Sentative of his religious writing •• 
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cease. The Cartesian aOi1tg ~. ~ has otten been repea-
ted. • •• But it the I ino--is interpreted as mean-
ing a particular existing human elng. philosophy erleaJ"How 
silly; here there 1s no question ot yourselt or myself, but 
solely ot the pure ego." But this pure .US!. cannot very well 
have any other than a purely oonoeptualiilstence: what then 
does the ~ mean? There i, no conclusion here. tor the 
proposition-rs a tautology.lo . 
The above criticism ot Descartes' proposition eQgi~2 
. 
ergo s~ is Kiorkegaardfs fundamental criticism of all abstract 
thinking. Not only does abstract thinking abstract from the exi~ 
tenee oitha object known, but Kierkegaard would even have the 
abstract think~r abstract from his own existence, 
In the following passage, another reference is made to 
the Socratic waY,ot philosophieing. Again, Kierkegaard emphasi-
zes the ethical point of view, and distinguishes abstract ~;ought 
from pure thought. 
In Greece as in the youth of philosophy generally, it ~. 
found difficult to win to the abstract and to leave exis-
tence, which always gives the particular1- in modern times_ on the other hand, it has become difficu t to reach exis-
tence. The process of abstraction is easy enough for us, 
but we also desert existence more and moret and the realm ot 
pure thought is the extreme limit of such desertion. In 
Greece, philosophizing was a mode or action, and the philo-
pher was therefore an existing individual. He may not have 
possessed a great amount of knowledge, but what be did know 
he knew to some profit, because he busied himself early and 
late with the same thing. • • • The ethical may apeee Rome 
restraint, 511'1ce it accentuates ex1s\ri)nce, and abstraot 
thOtight and humor st111 retain a relationship to existence. 
But pure thou[~bt. haa won through to a per-filet Victory, and 
has notn1ng. nott11ng to .do with ,exlstence.17 
16 ~.t 231, also 27S, 29), 296, 515. 
17 .1hi.d .. 2(,11) ... 
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Kierkegaard has been charged by some commentators with 
being irrational. 'I'hat Klel'kftgaard was irrational can be att!rmed 
and denied provided the proper distinctions be gi1len. Tho. who 
would favor the affirmation ot: the oharg<-) \rould most likely 
choose a paa.ge like the following one to subst.antiate their 
cha~ge. Abstract t bought, since 1t "ab.t.racts from existence, • 
• is ethically 80 little meritorious that it must. be regarded ra-
ther as rephrehens1ble. rt18 Abstract knowledge tor Ki(~rkegaard 
had no ultimate and absolute value as €A solution to his problem. 
In this sense he eondidared it reprehensible. and hence Kie.:{'ke-
gaard :8 rightly charged with irrationality. Ultimat.ely faith, 
the f'ina1 atage 1n existence, will brlnE~ the tinal solution to 
Kierkegaard'. ethical problem. It will be a r.9,lth \vhlch receives 
no aid trom r;t4S0n. But it would be Inaccurated too brand. U.rk .... 
gaard as beitlg completely irratiOMl. Inth. above quotation, 
the worda. 'i:tr~Ui •• X: mU:~liQ£lsn'l, are highly significant tor a 
prope ... underet.and:lngot Kierkegaard f e way ot thinking. 
To miaoon.true Kieckegaard' 8 thlcal, volitional, and 
"dec1.1 ve ft problem a8 a problem ot knowled.~e Itiould be to mise the 
point ot his thought,. K1erkega," rd a dill ts the lWi1 of abstract. 
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of this thesis, "oJ hen he SiiyS that the truth of Christianity i8 
taken for granted. The real problem is how to live it. 
Treating abstract thought in terms of objectivity, 
Kierkegaard distinguishes the ~ of objectivity from the .!Um of 
subjectivity. ffThe objective accent falls on ,,;HAT is said, the 
subj acti ve accent on Hm~ it is s~1d. • • • Obj actively the inter-
est is foccused merc:ly on the thought-content; subjectively on 
the inwardness."l9 l4oreover. he asserts that It [abstract thought]at 
its highest is possibility.ff20 Sinee abstract thought does not 
posit an ethical relationship within the individual, it does not 
solve Kierkegaardts problem ...... the problem of reality, of becoming 
a Christian. The relationship of abstract thought to reality, 
Kierkegaard puts in the f'ollowing way« 
Abstract thought can get hold ot reality only by nullifying 
it, and this nullification of reality consists in transform-
ing it into possibioity. All that is said about reality 1n 
the language of abstraction and within the sphere ot abstract 
thought is really said within the sphere or the possible. 
The entire realm of 8bstraet thought, speaking in the language 
of reality, sustains the relation of possibility to the 
realm ot reality; but this latter reality is not the one 
which is incl\!ded within abstraot thought and the realm of 
the possible.Zl 
Again, Kierkegaard takes the stand that abstract thought 
excludes existence, and that it abstracts thought-content trom 
19 Ibi<\., 1$1. 
20 Ibid.. 515. 
21 Ibid •• 279. 
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reality and thus reduce. reality as known to possibility. Hene. 
he distinguishes the order ot abstract 1hought trom that of ethea! 
reality, the order ot human existence. A &lore partlcular reason 
ror this distinction aooording to Kierkega':irdta way ot thinking 
is that "e~i8t.nc. as a particular human being i8 not a pun 
ideal existence; it is only man~ln-general who exists in that 
manner, which means that this entity does not exist at all. Ex-
istence i8 always something particular; the abstract does not ex-
ist. From this to draw the conclusion that the abstract is with-
out validity is a miaunderstanding.n22 
From the above pa •• age and tro. those immediately pre-
ceding, it can be fJe$n that Klerkegaard waa at grips w:1"th a prob-
lem that baa had great importance in the history ot phUo$Ophy .... 
that ot universal. and the knowledge of existence. ".though Kia,. 
kegaard ralegat.a abstract thought as representative 01 reality 
to the world ot possibility. he neverthel ••• does not write It ot 
&$ a ablntqm 8. be do.s the pure thought at the He~e11ana. This 
in hi8 own worda would be a misunderstanding. 
Klerkegaard wax.. most 84t1r10&1 in his condemnation ot 
pure thought and ,tthe .:.iyst_." the Hegelian philosophy which ws 
tau.\r.ht 1n the un!vers! ties ot his day. For hlll, -the so-called 
pure thought is 1n tJ;eneral III psycholot:t1eal curios! ty, a remarobl • 
• J.' ••• 
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species ot combining and construing in a fantastic medium, the 
medium of pure being.,,2) Again, he denies the validity ot pure 
thought by stating that "pure thought is a phantom."2J.., His sa-
tirical antipathy for pure thought as the antithesis ot a solu-
tion to the prd)lem ot existing he states in many passages simi-
lar to the following one. 
Everywhere it is decisively concluded that~ought is the 
highest stage ot human development; philosophy moves farther 
away from. contact with primitive existential impressions, 
and there is nothing lett to explore, nothing to experience. 
Everything has been finished, and speculative thought has 
now to rubricate, classily, and methodIcally arrange the 
various concepts. One does not live any more, one does not 
act, one does not believe; but one knows what love and faith 
are, .nd it only remains to determine their place in the 
System. In the same way the domino-player has his' pieces 
betore him, and the game consists in Pdtting tbem togethel\2f 
Again, there is evident the antithesis between Hegelian 
~hilo8ophy in its approach to reality and that which Kierkegaard 
~ould have. It would seam trom Klerkegaard t s writings that his 
~nowledg. of Hegelian philosophy was not a very profound one baaed 
pn a close study of Hegel's works. But it must be noted that 
Kierkegaard was not wanting in the fundamental retutations ot "the 
System." Those refutations he culled from personal experience 
and from reflection on his own existence. The concreteness of 
2) PgstsS£iUt., 269. 
24 ~ •• 261 
25 Ib1g., 307-306; ct., e.g., 269, 27), 2SJ, 295. 
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Kierkegaard'a argumentation bears out this observation, al may be 
gathered from t.he follo\dng refutation whioh he ot!:'erlh 
'W'hen an existing individual raises ~h. question of the rela .. 
tion between thought and being, thinking and existing, and 
philosophy explains that it 1s one of identity, the answer 
does not reply to the queation because it does not reply to 
the questioner. Philosophy explain, .. "Thought and being are 
onel but not in conneotion with things that are what they 
are solely by virtue of ex:rstl ng, a 8 for example a rose. 
which haa no Idea wi thin :1 tseltl- and hence not in connection with thinga that make it most e early evident what it meana 
to exist as opposed to what it means to think. But thoutht 
and being are one in connection with things who •• existence 
la essentially indIfferent, because they are so abstract as 
to have only conceptu.al eXIstence." To answer the qu •• tion 
In this DUilnnet> 1s to evade 1t; 1'01" the question had 1"eter.. 
~mce t.o existence us a particular human being. An existence 
of this sort is ot a dIfferent order from the existence ot 
a potato, but neither Is it the kind of existence that 
attaches to an Idea. Human 9Xi$t~nce has Idea In it. but 1. 
not pure11 ideal exlstance.20 
The above rebuke to Ue,::elian thoU;;:;ht contains a denial 
ot the identi ty ot thou;;ht and being. Klerkegurd also makes .it 
clear that exlst~nce, though he treats it as subjectivity in hi. 
own philouopby. 1. not an Ideal ext.tenc.. He likewise distin-
gu1sh.a existence 1n the e t,1cal sense in ;·hich he takes 11;, trom 
existence such as 18 had by lilt rose or potato. In other woms, 
Klerkegaard' 8 approach to alstenee 18 not a Jneta;,hysical one, Wt 
an eth.1c"'kl one. The existential "alue at truth he repeats 1s the 
tollow:J.ng cll.vewal of Heg.elian thouejlt. 
aut a philosophy of' pu nJ thou;~h't :1 s ro1" an existing indl vi-
ual a chimera, it the t.r~th that is uOLgh t 1& something to 
J "rill ... 
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exist in. To exist under the guidance of pure thQught ia 
like travelling in Oenma.rk with the help of Ii small map ot 
Europe, on which Denmark show" no larger than a steel pin-
point--aye, it is still more impossible. The admiration and 
enthusiasm ot the youth. his bound.ltl. confidence in Hegel 
is precisely the satire upon Hegel. 47 
In speaking of existence in Hegelian philosophy, Kler-
kegaard states that it is a philosophy without a beginning. "The 
eternity of abstract thought is arrived at by abstracting trom ex-
istence. The realm ot pure thought is a sphere in which the ex-
isting individual finds himself only by virtue ot a mistaken b .... 
ginning; and this error revenges itself' by making the existence 
at the individual insignificant, a nd giving hi$ language a flavor 
ot lunacy_naa This is strong language tor one engaged in so eru-
dite and polite a circle as philosophy. Nor can one help being 
somewhat astonished a.t the outspoken manner of Kierkegaard when 
he reflects on the position which Hegelian philosophy held in 
Kierkegaard's onw day and count-ry. 
One last quota.tion here will suffice for an indication 
of the relation between sree,culative philosophy and Christianity 
85 Klerkegaard saw it. "Speculative philosophy, a IS abstract and 
objective, entirely tglnores the tact ot existence and inwardness; 
and inasmuch as Christianity accentuates this tact pa.radoxically, 
27 Ibi\l •• 275. 
26 Ibid. J 277. 
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speculation is the greatest possible misunderstanding of Chris-
tianity.,,29 
Before moving to the third kind of thought proposed by 
Kierkegaard as the only valid klnd--that of the subjeotive. exis-
ting thinker, the reader may review briefly the main points made 
by Kierkegaard concerning abstract and speculative thought.. 
Abstract 1hought since it abstracts from existence ia 
inadequate to represent. reality as it is actually. However. it 
has validity in that it represents reality as po&sibility, and 1n 
this sense retaina a relation to reality. 
S'2ICM;Lat~ve thought, or the pure thought of Hegelian 
philosophy is mere p~int2m and worthless. fhe major point of 01"1 
ticism Which K1erkegaard levels at Hegelian philosophy are the 
follo\dng; motion in Hegel is abrogated by pure thought30 or 1"ele 
gated to the contines of logie; existence is abrogated by pure 
th ough t; contingency and human freedom cannot be explained in 
terms of human experience and existence along vdth the necessity 
of the triadic evolution of the thesis, antithesiS. and synthesl. 
and finally, the fact· that tUH!suJ;ati,V:1 philosophy has assumed the 
prerogative ot making Christianity what it thinks Christianity 
-
29 Ibid •• 507. 
)0 For a fuller discussion or Kierkegaard'a reaction 
to Hegel, see Collins, "The Attack Upon Hegelianism," 219-252; 
also by the same author, ftKierkegaard's Critique or Hegel," 
Thquib~. XVIII, March. 1942. 74-100. 
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ought to be.31 
Atter one has seen Kierkegaard's views on abstract and 
speoulative thought, it is proper to turn onets attention to that 
thought which Kierkega.ard accepts as the solution to his problem. 
It is the thought of the subjective thinker. Kierkegaard intro-
duces his reader to the rubjective thinker by way of a comparison. 
I1There is an old saying that arllttg, ~entatiSh meg1"I~ig :CIei'S t 
th o~m. Similarly there is required tor a subjective thinker 
imagination and t eelin5h dialectics in exietential inwardness, to-
rtether with passion.ff32 Already it is possible to see trom the 
terms employed in this quotation and inclination toward the sub-
activism ot the faith in which Kiarkegaard had been reared. 
according to Kierkegaardts Lutheran upbring.;..ng was one 
hich stmred little company with the rational tradition of philo-
ophy, but which did take into account the emotional disposition 
f the individual. For the subjective thinker, Kierkegaard has 
speeific task prescribed- that ot "understanding himself in 
)1 Further discussion or the point:;} mentioned here may 
e found in the following works: Swenson, S thin About Klafka-
aa 61, 96 .. 118; \,;ahl, EtUd~ Kle e as nn S9-f72; Jol. 
at, ntroduction a Kierkegaa! ; £. • len, K!etke"f!ir.i. 
Us ~ire ~ Thfught, London, 1':135, 62-72; P."ieiss, n2xlstenz 
n egel, Phl~oso~bX and p"lenOme~lO{:~ieal Resea£2h,. VIII nec •• 
947. 206-216; ~. nlrch;-rierEii~a -~~4gtin, ~uttersloh. 1933, 
I. nos. 1-2. 
32 Kierkegaard, P2stsc£~pt, 313. 
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his existence.")) Kierkegaatd goes on to explain it. "The task 
the subjective thinker is to transform himself into an instrur118 
that clearly and definitely expresses whatever is essentially h 
man.")4 The personal aspect ot the thinker is marked in the fol 
lowing\vords. "An existential thinker must be pictured as esse 
tially thinking. but so that in 'presenting hi8 thought. he skate 
hisselt."); The sphere of action of the subjective thinker is 
dica ted in the following words, "The subjecti va t hlnker has on 
a s Ingle scene, existence. rt)6 f<lore specifically this scene is ft 
wardness in existing as a human being, concreteness is attained 
through bringing the existential categories into relationship w 
one another.")? These existential categories will be treated in 
the following chapter on eXistence; so there will be no further 
discussion of thea here. In connection with the relationships 
just mentioned, Kierkegaard mentions another note which is char -
teristlc or the subjecti Vet thinker. This note is that of retIa 
tion stated in connection with truth interpreted in the subject! e 
manner as understood by Kiarkegaard. 
)3 Kierkegaard., Pgs'ti£tctiJ!t, )14. 
34 Ibid., )1S. 
)5 Ibig •• 319. 
)6 lW· 
37 lW·. 320. 
Itf moat. or the \yorks which preceded the religiou8 
~¥ot'ks. Klerkegaard used pSlaudonyms. l'hu$ by placing betore hi. 
readers 11 'ling pcr,~ anal! ties \liho think ~nd apeak ,Cor tJlfiaMl ve •• 
Kierkegaard hoped to teach indirectly man what it. means to liYe. 
By the p8eudoD)'IlB he also hoped teo avoid a title !IOat odious to 
him, that. or P.t2ftsl9.t-
In an appendix to the i!Rlt,UtliSi K1erkegaard acknow-
ledge. the authorship of the paeudonymous works. "If'ormally and. 
tor the sake ot regularity I acknowledge herewit.h ••• that, I _ 
the author. .a people would oall 1. t, of ifiltblE I..Q£. • • • tb16a-
~gpb~g~~ ~tlSlIQ'1 (Johann •• ClimaCUI), ••• Q2Rg'~QADi ~ 
19t&Q,l !2 1QI i!1 &'9aabiilJ. f.tUlfin1A1 (Johanne. C11llacua)... .,,1 
One further point 11erkega.ard makes olear concerning 
the foundation or the pseudonyms. 
Ny paeudOl'1yml1:'ty ot polynym1ty has not had a casual ground 1n 
1Iy person, ••• but it has an ~IU%l~!I. e;round in the char-
acter ot the R£29"~Slh which 11.01' t.l~ $ ke or the 11nea 
aacribed to t e au~ or" and thG psycholo?;ically yaP-led dis-
tinctions of the individualities poetically required COlI-
plfite regardlessne$$ 1n the d 1:rection ot ,;ood and evil, of 
contrition and hJ,;;h Sr"'irita, of despair and pren:n,uaptlon, ot 
;)utt"'ering and exultat on etc., which is bounded. only 1<le~1. 
iy by psychological con&'llstency. ll:md which rO{.tl aotual per-
sona in the actual ~lloral limitations of reality dare not per. 
mit ti1em$elvea to indulge in, nor oould wish to. What 18 
t. f I I. U 
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When th~question of truth is raised in an objective manner, 
reflection is directed objectively to the truth, as an ob-ject to which the knower is related. Reflection is not fo-
cussed upon the relationship, however, but upon the question 
of whether it is the truth to which the knower is related. 
It only the object to which he is related is the truth, f~he 
subject is accounted to be in the truth. \1/h8n the question 
of the truth is raised subjectively, reflection is directed 
subjectively to the nature ot the individual's relationship; 
if only the mone of this relationship is in the truth, the 
indi vidual is in the truth even it cthe should happen to be 
thus related to what is not' true .)0 
It is to be noted that Kierkegaard in the above passage 
again distinguishes truth taken in the objective sense and in the 
subjective sense. In the objective Bense. the purpose of our re-
flection is to establish the truth or falsity ot what is known. 
But this is not the truth which interests Kierkegaard. SubjectiY4 
truth or that which one lives from the ethical point or view ia 
his concern. The question which is of most importance to Kierke-
gaard in this matter is the mode ot the relationship ot the indi-
vidual to what he knowa. In other words, the existential aspect 
is the important one, and it 1s not concerned with the proof ot 
objective truth as such. To make this point clear, Kiekegaard 
appends the f"ollo\dng note to the passage quoted above. "The rea. 
der will observe that the question here 1s about essential truth, 
or about the truth v;hich is essentially r elated to existence, and 
that it is precisely tor the aka at clarifying it as inwardness 
or as subjectivity that this contrast is drawn. nJ9 
)6 ll21s1~. 178. 
39 lW., 
4.3 
One f~hould note in reading the above passage that exi .... 
tence as taken here is not existel'lCe in the meuphysical sense, 
but an exiato:nce in decisiveness. Hence it is an ethioal exis-
t'lJ'lCe.. ',rheb one reads the word Itthinki,ng." he usually considers 
it strictly as a purely IntellactLlal activity. But for Kierke-
gtlard, the term embraces much mQr$-thinking. willig, and reel-
ing in t.he composite of at-hiesl existence. 'rho term frequently 
used by the commentators to designate this activity 1s W&\tWI. 
In Qttemptlng to understand Kierkegaardts stand on truth, on 
must recall that his point or view 1s that ot the moralist. i'''or 
him. knowledge 1. valid 1t it 1s an ethice-religious knowledge 
whoae truth lies in its very appropriation by the knowing subjee 
Such knowledge does not a 1m to know the obj ect a s such t nor does 
it aUt to know the objeetive truth about ita object. It do •• not 
even al. to kno1!l' that that with ~.'lhlch it .8t~lbllshe8 :relations 1. 
true. In this subjective knowledge ot Kierkegaard. the relation-
ship itael! 1s the truth. The only ree.lity which an exist.ing be-
ing ca.n knO\w othet"lda8 than through some abstract knowledge 1:; 
his own, namely the tact that he exists t This reality 1s his ab-
solute lnt$r~st.40 'the rollowlni~ pa::;MI~es trom K1erkegaard bear 
out this interpretation. 
I I 1'" • k II I t 1 
40 An accurate discus.lon of the ethico-roli;;~lous kno 
ledge or KiQrk~gaard may be found in: Gilson, B,.~ ~~ PrAl-
J.QIQlIlhltlh 149. 
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The mode ot apprehension attha truth is precisely the truth • 
• • • 41 The subjectiye thinker 1s a dialectician dealing 
with the existential and he has the passion ot thought re-
quisite tor holding fast to the qualitative disjunction. , • 
• 42 The ;3ubjective thinker i;5 not a man ot science, but an 
artist. EXisting is an art.4) 
The art ot existing for Kierkegaard is one of dialecti-
cal movement which culminates in faith. But betore the exister 
arrives at that peak, he must first make t1is way dialectically by 
struecle and constant striving. It is through the decis:Lons ot 
the will that t.he individual exister moves through the spbere. ot 
existence tinally to become a Christian. 
In the above passage Kierkegaard states that it is ne-
cessary to hold fast to the quali tat.i ve disjunction or distinctia 
between the spheres of existenoe. Here he opposes the quantita-
ti ve disjunction af tile Hegelian dialectiC J which is effected by 
the necessary evolution at the Idea. But any diSjunction or dis-
tinction to be attained in the life of an existing individual 
comes trom the qualitative disjunction. that is, any change from 
on~! sphere of existence ta another is ef'tected by the deci.ivene 
of the existing individual. 
Kier'kegaard likens the subjective thinker to the artist 
who subordinates and integrates the various elements of' life into 
his life portrait. For Kierkegaard, the subjective thinker, or 
41 Kierkegaard, Postscrlgt, 2S7. 
42 ~b~a •• J1J. 
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the artist of living, "is esthetie enough to ~;1ve hJ.3 lih esthe-
tic content, ethical anoug;b to re6-ull1.~ it, and d iulectical 
enough to interpenetrate it with thought.ff~ The artist ot living 
always keeps as h1s point or un1 ty the all-impol"'ttmt factor ot e» 
istence. If Gt]. does not abstract tram existence. but lives it 
while at the Mme time thtnklng.' In all hls thinking he there-
fore has to think tbe tact. that he 1. an «lating individual_,,4-, 
The point ot 1;h16 existential preoccupation for lU .. erke-
gaard is that in this way alone ca.n the Chr1 at1M sol vo t.he prob-
lem of becoming and being II Christian. "to Llllde:"stami onesolf in 
existent". 1s a180 the Christian principle, except that this 'e.lf! 
has received tar richer and deeper determination. still more dif-
ficult to understand in conjunction with exi8t.~;,m:e."46 
The last striking characteristic of the subjective 
t,hinker. '\It hioh 1& all.important in the last sphere ot: existence, 
paradoxical rell{~1ouane$s. 18 that "the believer 18 a subjeotive 
thinker • .,47 The subjective expression of the believer 1.$ faith. 
autor. this treabnent of subjectivity in Ki$rkegaard .1s eonclude~ 
the ma1ning ot r~lth 1n Klerkegfiard will be briefly conaddered • 
It • I 
44 Klcrkege.ard, Pgltlat4a1i, 314. 
4' 19~i· 
46 !W-
It? tbig-
46 
'" For Kierkegaard faith is the maximum position of exis-
tence. "From the Christian point of view there is no advanoe be-
yond faith, because faith is the highest stage for an existing in 
dividual. ft4a In relation to the absolute t!lQ!, already considers 
faith is the "collision of finite and intlnite."49 Defining faith 
by its object, K1erkegaard says,. "For the absurd 1s ~le object ot 
faith and only object that can be believed.";O To specify more 
thisobjeot of faith, "The absurd," he says, "is that the eternal 
truth has come into being in time."sl In relation to the intellec 
faith is the "crucifixion or the understanding."s2 But the oruci-
fixion of the understanding, unintelligibility 1s not enough tor 
the existential philoi30pher. "Faith must not rest content with 
unintelligibility; for precisely the relation to or the repulsion 
from the unintelligible, the absurd, is the expression for the pI. 
sion of faith.";) Kierkegaard defines the passion ot faith in the 
following manner. "Faith is the objective uncertainty due to the 
repulsion ot the absurd held fast by the passion of inwardness. 
4$ Ibid., 2;9. 
49 t.hid ., 208. 
50 Ibid II J 189. 
51 IbiQ., 199. 
52 Ibisi., 4f!9. 
53 Ibid •• 540. 
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which in thi~in5tance is intensified to the utmost degree. This 
formula fits only the believer. no one else, not a lover, not an 
enthusiast, not a thinker, but s~p11 the believer who is related 
to the absolute paradox.n54 
Kierkegaard now distint~ui shes thi s passion of tal th 
from the passion of other spheres of the exister. "Faith is a 
sphere for itself which, paradoxically distinguished trom the 
esthetic and metaphysical, accentuates existence, and paradoxical 
11 distinguished from the ethical, a ccentuates the existence ot 
another person, not onets own eXistence.n;; The existence ot the 
other person referred to here is the ecistence of the !!tsutd. 
To tie faith more closely with his problem ot becoming 
a Christian, Klerkegaard gives the ultimate speCification ot the 
object or faith. "Well, it is perf.o~y true that Christ i8 the 
object ot faith.,,56 Thus the ultimate ph.a. in becoming a Chris-
tis.n is faith, whoae object is the Ood-man. 
Again it may be noted that in Klerkegaard t s conception 
at faith there is no room for the company of reason. Faith in 
the final sphere of existence excludes reason. A further crit i-
eiam ot Kierkegaardfs notion of faith will be given in Chapter V 
54 Ibis;l., 540. 
55 ~., 514. 
56 Ibig., 530. 
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of this thesis. 
By way or cJnclusion of this chapter on subjectivity. 
the qualities of the subj ecti va thinker may be Sl.:UlliliSd up in the 
following manner. The subjective thinker is one whose task is to 
transform himself into an instrument that clearly expresses in 
e.xistence whatever is essentially human. For him existential in-
wardness is required. Essential knowledge for the subjective 
thinker is all knowledge which is related to existence. TIle mode 
by which the existential thinker a.pprehends truth is precisely 
the truth. He is not a scientist. but an artist Who integrates 
in his life portrait all the essential elements of human life. 
The subjective thinker is a believer for whom faith 18 
the highest stage of existence. His faith is a G21J:~f.\;1Qa wit.h 
the infinite. which is referred to as the Rbsolute telSR, or end 
ot all the subjective thinker's striving. Specifically, the ab-
surd is the eternal truth, who has come into being 1n time. Fait 
renders reason unintelligible and has its expression in the pas-
sion resulting from the relation to or the repulsion from the ab-
surd. Faith accentuates existence and is paradoxically distinct 
from the ethical sphere of existence in that it accentuates not 
its own existence, but that of i:"mother. This Pother is the person 
of the God-man, Christ. Hence faith has as it2 object Christ. 
This sphere ot existence is the ultimate stage in becoming a 
Christian. 
49 
Faith hae been seen here to be the highest sphere ot 
existence. It is now apropos to treat or the spheres of ex!a-
tene.which are preparatory and subordinated to this r1n~1 sphere 
The treatment ot the spheres ot existence will follow immediately 
in the n~xt chapter. 
CHAPTER IV 
THREE STAGES OF EXISTENCE 
To appreciate adequately Kierkegaard's theory ot exis-
tence, one must always keep in mind his point ot vie". It is not 
that ot the metaphysician nor that ot the logician, but that of 
the subjective thinker. Consequently, his explanation ot exis-
tence will be in the realm ot the ethical for the most part since 
he has clearly rejected any idealistic explanation or existence. 
Lest the subjective point ot view startle whose who are accus-
tomed to viewing reality always from the objective point ot view, 
it .might be noted that Jacques Yiaritain thinks that the intuitio 
by which Kierkegaard evolved his theory of existence is the same 
as that which is at the heart ot Thomls.m.. the intuition ot the abo 
solutely singular value and primacy ot the act ot eXisting, and 
ot existence as exercised.l 
The active aspect of existence Kierkegaard brings out it 
/ 1 Jacques Maritain, Court traite de l'existenee et de 
l'existant, Paris, 1947. 208. "Nous croyons que l'intuition cen-
trale dont vivait l'existentialisme d'un Kierkegaard etait en fin 
de comte celle mem. qui est ~u coeur du thomisme,~l'intultion de 
1. valeur absolument singuliere det de 1a primaute de ltexister, 
de l'existen¥~8; YA exerclta." 
50 
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the following passage. 
Existence itself~ the act ot existing, is a striving, and is 
both pathetic and comic in the same degree. It is pathetic 
because the striving is infinite; that is, it is directed 
toward the infinite. being an actualization of infinitude, a 
transformation which involves the highest pathos. It is CQ-
mic because such a striving involves a self-contradiction.z 
In his treatment of truth Kierkegaard asserts, as has 
. 
been seen, that abstract thought, the second medium. abstracts 
from existence. But existence, the first medium, "has combined 
thought and existence by making the existing individual a 
thinker. It) This combination ot thought and existence in the sub-
jective thinker is effected by decisiveness. or will-action, 
since decisiveness is precisely the act of the subjective thinker 
Hence the union of thought and existence in the existing thinker 
constitute the existential relation ot ethical truth in the sub-
jective thinker. Kierkegaard reters to this moment or choice 
which is repeated again and again in the dialectical movement 
toward faith. ffReality or existence is the dialectical moment of 
a trilogy, whose beginning and whose end cannot be for the exis-
ting individual. sinee qua existing individual he is himself in 
the dialectical moment. nit Kierkegaard then connects the concept. 
2 Postscript, 84. 
:3 ~., 271!. 
4. lW.., 279. 
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written therefore i8 in tact mine, but only 1n ao tar as I 
put into the mouth or the poetically actual Individuality 2 
whom I produced, hie life-vie", expressed in audible line •• 
Though K10rkegaard would seem to give the impression 
t.hat the tbOUt~ht. represented in the ~:()l'd6 ot the pseudonymou8 
author. are not his personal t.h.;:;ughta, nor a reflection ot hi. 
own life. the facts ot hlt~ 111 •. would seem t.o lndlcat.e tbe con-
trary. .Perhaps the use ot the pseudonyms was a t"011 by which he 
".'ou1d ."foid the char,. ot indoctrinating tJ:le pub11.c with his per-
sonal theories. ae took it upon h1.11".11 to show man how a Chris-
tian should liYfh He did not wish to do thie directly, but ra-
ther incliree'ly by presenting ideally people 'Who express their 
tfnu.L~hta for themselv$8. ,6y aeeing how t.hey thought. and lived, 
perhaps his readers 'Would follow their example. In tht. way, 
Kierkegurd could lnd.1reotly communioate to bls readers the wa1 
to 11v,8 wit.bout being oa.lled fC9(15Uier-
lb. purpose or this thesis 10 to give. logical pr ••• r~ 
tation ot t.be philosophy of K.iorkeg~.u''d. 'i'he procedure will be 
exeget.ical. The passage. which beet expla1tl the: various l>olnta 
or 'lerk.gluard'. doot.rine have been taken trom ulan)" plaoe. in his 
two most pll:tloso£:ihio _Titing_, the UaS9DIlwitrli 2Si'El5:~"Q Pill-' 
sqript. and the ~h"9I.2M'Q 'mRmel • 
• 
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of existence and decision while speaking of movement. "The goal 
of movement for an existing individual is to arrive at a decision 
and to renew it."' 
Again, Kierkegaard puts movement out of the sphere of 
the metaphysical as such, a nd into the ethical. because his prob-
lem is not one of becoming as such, but one of becoming a Chris-
tian. From the Christian point of view as Kierkegaard sees it. 
subjectivity culminates in passion, Christianity is the para-
dox, paradox and passion are a mutual fit, and the paradox -
is altogether suited to one whose situation is, to be in the 
extremity of existence •• , The existing individual has by 
me ,ns of the paradox itself come to be placed in the extrem-
ity ot existence.6 
Here Kierkegaard joins the problem of becoming a Christian \vith 
the problem of existence. 'l'he explanation ot existence which 
Aierke~aard will give, will be the explanation of his basic prob-
lem of becoming a Christian. 
By introducing the note ot consciousness, Kierkegaard's 
explanation ot existence moves in the direction or the ethical. 
"But really to exist, so as to interpenetrate one's existence witli 
consciousness, and yet also present in existence and 1n the pro-
cess or becoming: that is truly difficult."? The difficulty 
arise. trom the making ot a choice and its renewal. Just as Kier-
keg.aard t 8 con sidera tion wa s inadequate in that he wa a not formally 
concerned with ontological or with logical truth as such, 
6 Ibig_, 206. 
? Ih1d ?'7"l 
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~ but rather with an ethico-religious truth as the explanation ot 
his problem, so too, his concept ot real! ty i~ollows the same pat-
tern. "The only reality that exists for an existing indIvidual 
is his own ethical reality ••• The real subject is not the cog .... 
nitive subject. since in kno'l'ling he moves in the sphere ot the 
possible; the real subject is tbe ethically exising subjeet. ffS It 
would be a hasty step to take this statement as the basi. tor a 
rejection by Kierkegaard of all reality outside the existing sub-
ject. Kierkegaard is interested in ethical existen<le essentially 
but as was seen in the previous chapter. he does admit the exis-
tenee at other things in reality. Ho>..rever, the existence ot 
things such as a rose is not an ethical existence and consequent-
ly of little interest to Kierkegaard. 
In accord with his entire position on subjectivity, 
Kierkegaard asserts that "to exist essentially is inwardness.'·9 
Since existence is the reality of the ethical individual, exist 
is thesp;1ere of his determination and growth. 
/ 
Aa a conaequence ot having made a decision 1n existence, the 
existing individual has attained a more specific determlna-
tien ot what he is; if he lays it aside, then it is not he 
who has lost something; he does not h:; va him.self while ha,.... 
paning to have lost something, but18e has lost himself and 
must now begin trom the beginning. 
8 Pgs'¥ser1Qt' J 280-2g1. 
9 IbiQ" 3fHt. 
10 .D1!sl., 437. 
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This statemtnt of Kierkegaard mora clearly IJpecl.fi&. 
\';ha t was referred to in a previous ohapter as the e trJ.enlor rQO 
pr.,:rsonall ty 01" the existing i,ndl vidual " ... ho is hi. actions invol-
ving choice. Nor does one acquire this personality by a .ere 
single choice. \, "[EJxiat~nce 1s not an abstract spurt but a 
steady striving 'and conttnuou$ moam.;hile."ll 'fh1s striving tor 
;aerkegaard lethe "process of becoming. ft12 This bocoming i6 the 
dislec't;1cal movement ot the individual t.oward fa! th, the highest 
point in Qxi!lt~nc"h One of the more subtle charact.eristica which 
Kiorkegaard attributes to existence 1$ that it is a "sjlnthesis of 
the infinite and thf;} firute and the ex13tin; individual is both 
tlnite and inrirli.tel~l.l To interpret th,i8 statement, one cannot 
f 
irrunedintoly jump 1;0 tho conclusion that. it ia some torm. ot pan-
theism. be'Otluse Kierkegaard goes to 3reat trouble in rejecting 
medlatlonoetwclen. the exiating individual and the fantastic 
1-am-1.14 Rather thlfl finite and infinite aspect or the individual 
must be expls.ined in term. of willing Md eternal happiness. 
All rt:llatlve volition 18 marked by willing something tor the 
aake ot SOiAething else, but tl'18 h.1.gheat end must be willed. 
tor ita own StlKe. And this ghe.t. end 1s not a particular 
something, tor then it would be relative to Gomethlng other 
U 1 
11 ~., 469. 
12 ;t"1~ •• 517. 
13 12151-, );0. 
14 lRi4., 176-177. 
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and be finite. It is a contradiction to will something fi-
nite absolutelYt since the finite must have an end, so that 
there CO!l'i6S a tlme "When it can no longer be willed. But to 
will absolutely is to will the infinite, and to will an ete~ 
nal happiness is to will absolutely, because this is an end 
which can be willed every moment.l ) 
Kierkegaard expresses infinitude here in terms of the 
volitional, the existential. He makes it clear that it is not a 
question ot distinguishing the finite from the infinite but it is 
,1 
a question ot existence. l\It is the existence of the individual 
always and repeatedly to will an eternal happiness. In this sens 
the individual, a finite creature, is also infinite because his 
,/ 
willing ot the inirinite happiness will have no !end. Kierkegaard 
I 
brings out this distinction more clearly in connection with the 
question of mediation. III Hegelian term for the reconciliation of 
opposites. 
But when the scene is in existinv: and not on pa.per, the madi 
ating individual being an exi~t individual (and thereby 
prevented trom mediateing), then any individual who becomes 
conscious of what it means to exist (that he exists) will 
instantly become an individual who distinguishes absolutely, 
not between the finite and the infinite, but between exis-
ting fini tely and existing tntini tely. For the tinite and 
the intinite6are put together in existence, in the existing individu.al. l 
This synthesis or the .fInite and the Inl'init6 is not.a 
permanent state at which OLe arrives through a single act. On 
the contrary, "it is only momentarily that the particular indi-
15 ~bia.t 353. 
16 .!.!lisi. J 375. 
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are three stages: an esthetic J anethieal, and a reli~~iou$. But 
these are not distinguished abstractly, as the immediate, the me-
diate and the synthesiso! the two, but rather concretely, in ex-
iste;;tial determinations as enjoyment-perdition; action-victory; 
suffering.n19 These stages according to Kierkegaard are not com-
pletely independent of one anotl;ler, but they have a mutual rela-
tion in the growth of the existing indididual. 
But in spite ot this triple division the book is nevertheles 
an either-or. The ethical and the religious stages have in 
tact an essential relation to one another. The difficulty 
with Either-Or is that it was rounded out to a conclusion 
ethically •••• In Either-Or the esthetic standpoint is re-
presented by means at an existential possibility. while the 
ethicist 1s existing. Now the esthetic is existential; the 
ethicist 1s militant. fighting !naif11CS! ~rae~g against the 
esthetic. over whiCh he again rea y ga ns e victory, not 
by means'ot the seductive gifts of the intellect, but with 
ethical passion and pathos; he seeks to d ·efend hUlaelf 
against the religious. In rounding out his pOSition as an 
et';ici.st" he does his utmost to dete nd himself against the 
deciSive form ot higher standpoint. That he should defend 
himself 1s quite in order, :3ince he is not a standpoint but 
an existing individual.20 
From the above passage, one gets a glimpse of the sta-
g(.)s Kierkegaard would :',ave the individual go through to become a 
Christian. What Ki::;rkegaard says here is somewhat si;iiilar to 
what one f'requtintly hears in terms of' asceticism. A person who 
is bent on attaining perfection will often strive against what is 
called his lower self. the self which seeks enjoyment and which 
19 Post.!cx;'i2~.. 260. 
20 Ib1i., 261-262. 
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tries to rationalize everything he does. He wants to regulate 
his life as a good one. yet he fears and in a way fights against 
the higher standpoint of perfection which involves sutfering. 
This experience can be shown to be the ease in the lives ot most 
men. 
For Kierkegaard. the first stage is that or possibilit1J 
of the intellectual approach to life. at is not concerned with 
living the truth but with grasping truth intelleotually and ima-
ginatively. Hence its criterion of action is not whether this is 
good or evil, but rather whether this truth is grasped intellec-
tually. The truth which the esthetic individual grasps is re-
duced to a possibility \tJ lieh in the ethical sphere may become for 
the existing individual an actuality. 
In connection with the e sthet!c and the intellectual, 
to ask whether this or that is real. whether it re~,lly ha.s 
happened, is a misunderstanding. So to ask betrays a £ail-
ure to C onCEd va the esthetic and the indellectual ideali ty 
as a possibility, and forgets that tadetennine a scale ot 
values for the esthetic and the intellectual in this manner, 
is 11ke rank1ng sensation higher than thoughtl Ethically it 
is correct to put the question ffIs it real?" But it is im-
portant to note that this holds true only when the indivi-
dual subject asks this question of hims~l.rl and concerning 
his o~m re£;.lity. He can a.pprehend the 8th cal reality of 
another only by thinking it. and hence as a possibillty.21 
/ For Kierkegaard it is not enough for the individual to 
have and idea ot hi s eternal ha'piness in order to be existing in 
the real sense of the lilord. The conceptions of eternal happiness 
21 Itli~ •• 266. 
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and of the final end tiO Kierkee;aard merely meant the possibility 
of change in the individual. This change or tr<.::.nstormation occur 
when the individual relers such a conception to himself :30 that 
makes it his chief concern to st!'i va 'Y/ith inwardness and pathos 
relate himselt to that for 1;:hich the concept stands, Klerkegaard 
! 
puts it in the following words.' 
In the relation to an eternal happiness as the absolute good 
pathos is not a metter of words, but of pennittlng this con-
ception to transform the entire exist.enee of the individual. 
Esthetic pathos expresses itself in \'lords, and may in its 
truth indicate that the individual leaves his real self in 
order to lose himself in the Idea; while existential pathos 
is preJEmt whenever the Idea is brought into relation ,dth 
the existence ot the individual so as to transform it. 1£ i 
relating i tsel! to the Indi "J'idual t s existence the absolute 
teloe fails to t ransi'orm it absolutely, the relationship 1s 
not one of existential pathos, but of esthetic pathos. TIle 
individual l'IlSY. for instance, have a correct conception, by 
mea.ns ot "¥'1hlch he is outside himself in the ideality of the 
possible, not with himself in eXistence! having the correct 
conception in the ideality ot the :':ctua l himself in. procf)Ss 
of being transformed into the ideality or the conception.aZ 
Again Kisckegaard makes the point that to have a concep 
of eternal happiness is not to be existentially related to it. 
'rhis relation must be established by decision. It is ltke the 
difterence between love a.s depicted by the lDetJ which is in the 
sphere of ideal1 ty ,alone. .F'or the actual lover love means choice 
Another statement of Kierkegaard brings out the distinction be-
tween the ethical Bflhere of a.ctua.l! ty and the esthetic sphere ot 
possibility. 
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For an existing individual the concept of an eternal happi-
ness is essentially related to his mode ot existence, and 
hence to the ideality of the actual; his pathos must be cor-
respondingly qualified. If we conceive love esthetically, 
we must acknowledge the principle that the poet's ideal of' 
love may be higher than anything that reality presents • • 
• • The pathos of the poet 1s therefore essentially imagina-
tive pathos. An attempt to establ1sh a poetic relationship 
to reality is thererore a misunderstanding. • • • Esthetical 
11 it is the poetic producl;ivity which i, essential, and the 
poet's mode ot existence is accidental.a) 
Kierkegaard formulates what has been said above into a 
principle. "The esthetic and intellectual prinCiple is that no re 
ality is thought or understood until its ~s!e has been resolved 
into 1 ts 22sS8. • • • But esthetically and intellectually tile 
ideality is the possible (the translation from esse ~ ~gsse~)"24 
In so far as the activity ot the esthetic l.ndividual is absorbed 
in the intellectual and imaginative appropriation of re;:::ilty, re-
ducing actuality to the possibility of thought, Kierkegaard dis-
tinguishes his mode of existence from the inwardness of the ethi-
cal individual as an outward action. 
Action outwardly directe may indeed transform existence (as 
when an emperor conquers the world and enslaves the people a) I 
but not the individual's own existence ••• If All such ac-
tion is theretore only esthetic pathos, and its law is the 
law for esthetic relationships in general; the non-dialecti-
cal individual transform the world, but remains himself un-
transformed, tor the esthetic indi vidual never ha s the dia-
lectical within him but outside him, or the individual is 
outwardly changed, but remains inwardly unchanged.25 
23 ~ •• 347-343. 
24 Ibid., 2g~-2g9. 
-25 Ibid., 187-3gg. 
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The idea here expressed is similar to that ot Saint 
~aul: "If I should speak with the tongues ot men and of angels, 
but do not have charity. I have become as sounding brass or a 
tinkling cymbal.,,26 
The point that Kierkegaard 1s making is that onets ex-
ternal actions may seem to indic_te great achievements in his ex-
istential development; but it his "inner lifeff27 is not trans-
formed by a relationship to the absurd through the appropriation 
ot choice. then his development has not progressed beyond the 
field of possibility, the esthetio sphere. 
For Kierkegaard. the individual whose activity is direc-
ted outward, is in the esthetic sphere of existence. However, 
such an individual is not confined to that field of existence. 
That field is merely the first step in his existential develop-
ment. "The esthetic is unopened inwardness; hence that i;1 hich is 
or should be inwardness must manifest itself as an outward per-
ception."2a Since the outwardness of the esthetic is unopened in ... 
\"lardness, the actual existence of the esthetic is the potential 
existence of the et:lical individual • 
.. 
26 I Cgt- 13. 1. 
27 Postsqriat., 367. 
26 Ib~d ... 4g2. 
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The notes given above are the predominant characteris-
tics which Kierkegaard ascribes to the esthet.ic sphere of exis-
tence.. 'fhay may be briefly summed up in the following manner • 
.c.;xthetie existence is mainly enjoyment; it finds no contradietion 
in existing. Esthetic existente is action outward and non-dia. 
lectical. Its dialectic is out~ide itselt. Esthetic existence i 
unopened inwardness, the potentiality ot ethical existence. Its 
operations are mainly in the imaginative and intellectual order. 
The principle ot the esthetic sphere of existence is formulated 
as follows: No reality 1s thought or understood until its!!!! ha 
been resolved to 2°851; reality is reduced to abstract and imagi-
native thought, which is possibility, not actuality, 
In the sum~ry above and in the preceding passages ta-
ken trom Kierkegaard. the term q~aleQtic is used. Since Klerke-
gaard uses it frequently .~en treating of the spheres ot existenc 
it should be briefly considered before the treatment on the ethi ... 
cal sphere of existence. 
Kierkegaard has already said that the existing indivi-
dual is a dialectician dealing with existence. He vigorously 
opposes the notion of the dialectic as had in Hegelian philoso-
phy, namely, the mediation of opposites in the sphere of imma-
nence, where the outward is the inward by an identiy ot thought 
and being. Transition in the Hegelian dialectic is effected by a 
smooth evolution ot the Idea on a quantitative basis according to 
Kif~rke aard When he 
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opposites in the Hegelian dialectio, he seems to mean that there 
is merely a numerical distinction between abstractions. Sinoe 
thought and being are identified in the Hegelian dialectic, the 
mediation of opposites by the necessity ot its evolution in Kier-
kegaardts opinion must be quanittative. This type ot dialecti-
ca.l immanence will preclude any kind ot tra.nscendence qualitatiYE 
ly distinct trom thought since thought and being are identified.. 
This notion would exclude the possibility ot a transition from 
reason to faith for Klerkegaard.. But reality for Kierkegaard 1. 
not a mere evolution ot abstractions. Contrary to this theory of 
"the dystemd he posits his existential dialectic which admits a 
qualitative distinction between opposites. Transition from one 
opposite to the other is not effected by a mediation ot the two 
into a synthesis which necessarily evolved, but rather transitioa 
is the qualitGH~ive change from one oPPosite or sphere to a.nother. 
This transition il effected by a free choice. By this choice the, 
indi vidual changes to another sphere qualitati valy distinct from 
its opposite. This theory leaves room for transcendence, which 
for Kierkegaard is :f'aith, the ultimate sphere ot the existing in-
dividual. The decision by which one changes trom one sphere to 
another is called the nleap." Kie rkegHard expresses himself on 
the dialectic in the tollow-ing passage: 
From" the abstract point of view there is no decisive con-
flict between the standpOints, because abstraction removes 
that in Which the decision 1nhe~est ~ e!~sting !UbJ§f~. 
But in spite of this consideratl.on, the immanent trans tion 
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ot speculative philosophy ia still a chimera, an illusion, 
as if it were possible tor the one standpoint necessarily to 
d.etermine itself into the other; tor the catego~ll' ot tran-
sition is itself a breach of immanence, a leap. lj 
The immanent transition ot the "System" was a mere chi-
mera for Kierkegaard. As he saw it, this transition prohibited 
t.he individual from determining itself from one categ;ory to an-
other. Again, Kierkegaard's point of view 1s the "existing sub-
ject" in whom the decision inheres. Kierkegaard continues to 
comment on the Hegelian dialectio. 
Vie must abstraot t rom the consideration already touched upon 
in the preceding, that acoess to the realm otthe historical 
1s subject to a quantitative dialectiC •••• But i;:>.gain and 
again to be absorbed i.n this everlasting quantification is 
harmful to the observer. who may easily lose the chaste 
purity ot the ethical, which dismisses the quantitative in .... 
finitely with a sacred contempt.30 
Kierkegaard now applies the Hegelian dialectic to his 
-
problem of becoming a Christian. 
For there is no immediate transition from the introduction 
to the becoming a Chriat~an. the transition rather constitu-
ting a qualitative leap.Jl 
Philosophy ofters an immediate introduction to Christianity, 
and so do the historical a.nd rhetorical introductions. These 
introductions succeed, because they introduce to a doctrine, 
but not to becoming a Christian. • •• But if the real dif-
fieulty is to become a Christian, thia being the absolute 
decision, the only possible introduction must be a repellent 
one. thus preCisely calling attention to the absolute deci-
sion. Even the longest of introductions cannot bring the in-
29 IW., 262, 
30 Ibid_, 126-127. 
31 Ibid." 34.0. 
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'" dividual a single step nearer to an absolute decision. For 
it it could, the decision would not be absolute) would not 
be a qualitative leap, and the individual v!ould be deoeived 
instead ot helped.J2 
In the above passage, Kierkegaard is referring to the 
introduction to Christianity made by the Hegelians with their 
quantitative dialectic. But inspite of their attempt to recon-
cile Christianity with "the System", Kierkegaard remains stead-
fast in his proposition that regardless ot how tar one strings 
abstractions, they still remain abstractions. Regardless of how 
many mediations or changes are made in that process, those 
changes still remain quantitative and not qualitative, They 
still remain in the sphere ot immanence, and ot necessary evolu-
tion, not in the sphere of the treely existing individual who 
deter"lines himself. 
By way ot swrunary, the main points in Kierkegaard t • no-
tion ot the dialectic are as follows, he rejects the Hegelian di-
alectic with its necessity of evolution, tts quantitative transi-
tion, and its preclusion of transcendence, going beyond reason by 
a qualitative transition, or by one which 1s effected by d.cisio~ 
This decision by which one crosses trom one sphere to another ill 
called "the leap." 
When the individual makes the transition from the esthe-
tic sphere to his new mode of eXistence. he becomes an ethically 
32 Ibtd •• 343 
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existing individual. It has already been seen in the treatment 0 
the esthetic sphere of existence that the ethical Gphere is one 
of action-victory. In terms of existence, Kierkegaard puts it in 
this way: "The real is an inwardness that is infinitely interestcrl. 
in existing; this is exemplified in the ethical individual.")J 
Kierkegaard considered the esthetic sphere basically as one or 
possibility. He now treataot the ethical sphere as the actual.i .... 
zation ot that possibility. 
Ethically regarded, reality is higher than possibility, The 
ethical proposes to do away with the disinterestedness ot 
the possible by making existence the infinite interest •• 
• • Ethics closes immediately about the individual, and de-
m~mds that he exist ethically •••• The ethical lays hold 
ot each individual and demands that he refrain from all con-
templation especially o.f humanity and the world •••• Such 
et'ilical contemplation is impossible, since there is only one. 
kind of ethical contemplation. name41, self-cont~nplation •• 
• • For the ethical, a s being the internal, cannot be ob-
served by an outsider, ••• This ethical reulity is the 
only reality which does not become a mere posaibioity thro 
being known, and which can be known only through being 
t.hought; ter it is the individual's own reality, Before it 
became a re;;lity it was known by him an the form of a con-
ceived re lity, and hence as a possibility.J4 
Kierkegaard in the above passage is bringing out the d 
tails of his theory of subjectivity. The ethical individual is 
interested in existence, his own existence. T~is interest is the 
reJation of the individual to t ruth by thinking it in term. ot 
"selt." It is the ethical sphere where thought and existence are 
I I r 
3) ~., 289. 
34. 
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united in the existing individual, not as abstrD.ct thought is re-
lated to a cognitive subject but as thoueht related to the indi-
vidual thinki'ng out his existence. Kierkegaard formulates the 
principle for tho "ethical sphere in this way: "The ethical prin-
ciple is that no possibility is understood until eaeh QOss~ has 
become an esse.";5 In other ~rords. thought is not real unless it 
is actually related to the existing individual who lives it. Lest 
the ethical be contused with any objective study or ethics. Kiar-
kegaard qualifies still more his notion of the ethical in terms 
of theindividual. "The ethical is concerned with particular hu-
man beings, and with each and every one of them by himself •••• 
The ethical requirement is imposed upon each individual. and 
when it judges, it judges each individual by himselt. w36 
14oreover. the knOl..rability of the ethj eal is proper only 
to the individual himself, ~3ince only he can realize it. nIt can 
be realized only by the individual subject, :400 alone can know 
\'lhat it 1s that moves within him.,,)7 The point here is similar to 
that contained in the saying: you cantt judee a ma.n's ....,nseienc. 
but the individual himself is the ultimate judge, God excepted. 
The last note of the ethical sphere of existence which we shall 
treat Kierkegaard states in terms of the dialectical. "If the 
35 Postscti~t., 288 • 
.36 Ibid_, 284. 
37 Ibid.1i. 2g4-2~l) 
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individual is dialectical in himself inwardly in salf-assertion. 
hence in such a '-fay that the ultimate basis in not dialectic in 
itself t inasmuch as the s elf which is at the basis is used to 
overcome and assert itself J then we have the a thieal iD;;¥erRre-
tation,"Jg The meaning of this passage seems to be that it the 
individual finds 'n time the coatradiciton or eXisting, that is, 
basing one's eternal happiness upon something historical, then he 
is ethioally dialectical. Th(:~ selt-assertion is the discovery 
within oneself that the individual is eternal. that is, destined 
for ttemal ha.pp:i.ness. He is dialectical in that he paradoxical-
ly relates himself, a being in time, to thatWlich is eternal. The 
ultimate dialectical basis is the absolute pe.radox by which the 
eternal has ceme into time. This dialectical basis is the basis 
.for faith, as will be seen in the treat,ment ot the third sphere 
of existenoe. The et:iical individual finds himself in a struggle 
to overcome outwardness and to maintain his relation to the ab-
solute telos • 
• 
Ethical existence, "essentially struggle and vic-
tory.,39 by its self-assertion 1n inwardness and by its discovery 
of the existential contradiction in its relationship to the abso ... 
lute talos for its eternal b.appineaa, is propaedeutic to the re-
ligious sphere of existence. The ethical sphere of existenoe i. 
essentially related to the religious sphere of existence. By 
)8 I,bid., 507 • 
.39 Ibid ... 256. 
69 
living ethically one tends to the religious sphere. 
Before the last sphara of existence is co~sidered as 
Kierkegaard saw it, the qualities of the et.ilionl sp;lere of exis-
tence may be summed up as tollows: ethical existence can be rea-
lized only by the indlvidual;.ethical existence 18 essentially 
struggle and victory in inwardness; the ethicnl interpretation 
ot existence is had when the individual is dialectical. that is, 
moving roward faith. 'l'he tJ.ltimate basis of this movement ot dia-
lectical inwardness is the s elf used to orercome and a Bsert selt. 
Theethical individual finds the contradiction of existenoe (haV'-
ing one's eternal happiness dependent on a relation to something 
~listorical) in self-assertion. Finally, the ethical principle 
is that no possibility is understood until each Eqsse has become 
an esse, that is, no truth (possibility in the abstra.ct) is under 
stood until one lives it in one's own exist.nc • 
The last sphere in Kierkegaardts Bchome is t.he religiou 
spher:~ of existence. Kierkegaard ex)laina the religious sphere 
terms of the individual. I1The religious individua.l is reflected 
inward, is conscious ot being existentia.~.ly in process of becom-
ing, a nd yet maintaining a relationship to an eternal happiness~ 
1'hus tar the religious sphere seems to be the 5 ame a.s the ethical. 
T;~is is true, a.nd in so far as this much of the religious sphere 
40 :I;.~iJ •• 406. 
70 
is the same as the ethical, It is frequently referred to as the 
sthiee-religious sphere. But the note which distinguishes the re-
ligious from the ethical is ft sutterIng." "The religious individu-
al sustains a relationship to an eternal happiness, and the sign 
of this relationship is s'utfering, and suffering is its essential 
sx.presssion tor the existing inde! vidual. -41 Kierkegaard briefly 
explains suffering as he understands it in the preceding passage. 
ffFor the suffering is rooted in the !!lct thet he the religious 
individual is separated from his happiness, but also signifies 
that he has a relationship to this l'.appiness. so that to be with-
out suffering means to be without religion.,,42 
Kierkegaard gives a ,further qu.alification of suffering 
as the characteristic trait of the re11~~1ous sphere as distinct 
from the ethical and esthetic. 
This suffering hat; 1'1:;5 grou.nd in the fact that L he individu-
al is in h1s immediacy absolutely committed to relative 
ends; its si~nit1eance lies in ehe transposition of the re-
lationship, the dying away from immediacy,4l or in the ex-
pression existe,ntially of the principle that the i.;tdividual 
can do absolutely nothing of himself. but is as nothing be-
fore God; for here ag2in the negative is the mark by which 
41 Ibl,a ... 407. 
42 ~ •• 406. 
43 'fhe term ~mmE)dillCi is used by Kierkegaard in oppo-
sition to the term r~fle~tIoD'Y it he mea~s the apprehension ot 
nature direotly either Sy trie senses or by J.ntuition without re-
flection. Hence he speaks ot immediacy frequently when he speaks 
4~9!h;o1:thetic sphere of exist.ence. cr. ~2st5crie1:t 251, .310. 
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the God-relationship is recognised, and self-annihilation is 
the eewerltial form of the God-relationship. And this self. 
annihilation must not receive an external ex}>ression. • • • 
The individual must not allow himself to int~gine that it can 
be d.one once for all t for this is 6sthetic.44 
From the above passage it can be seen that t.he religiou 
sphere is distinct from the ethical in that the God-relationship 
is not found wi th self-assertion, which is proper to the ethical 
s pherd, nor is it fOu..l1d wi th external expressions ot the God ... re .... 
lationshii). ·which is proper to the esthetic as found in religious 
poets. ff45 
Besides the characteristics ot the religious sphece al-
ready saen. Kierkegaard further qualifies chis sphere by distin-
guishing two types "religiousness Aft and "religiousness B.tf 
In terms of the dialectical Kierkegaard speaks ot re-
ligiousness A in -the following manner. "Religiousness A is the 
dialectic of inward trnnsformation; it is the relEltion to 
nal happiness which is not conditiJned by anything but is 
lectic inward appropriation of the I' ala tionship, and so is condi-
tioned only by the i'.1wardness of the appropriation and its dia-
lectlc. ftlt6 
In erms of immanence, a Hegelian term which Kierkegaar 
appropriated. chang;ing its meaninc~ trom ig,entit:t ~ ..t.!lgugh!: AWl 
44 Pos\sgr!2t. 412. 
45 ~b!d., 347·34~. 
46 Ib 494. 
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bl!n& to ~hoM&h~ in being. he explains religiousness A in a new 
light. 
The religiousness A comprehends the contradiction as sutter-
ing in self-annihilation, although with immanence, but by 
ethically accentuating the fact or existing i~ prevents the 
exister from becoming abstract in immanence.47 
The apprehension of the distinction "here" and "hereafterU 
is decisive tor every existence-communication. SP!SR&atil! 
rh&r2Sf,U2hX resolves it absolutely into pure being. • •• e-
Ig ousness A, which is not speculative philosophy, but yet 
is speculative, reflects upon thi' distinction when it re-
flects upon what it is to exist.48 
From this passage it can be seen that Kierkegaard posits 
as the basis of the God-relationship thought which is related to 
the existing individual and is accompanied by suffering. It is 
called the pathetic-dialectic since the individual is unhappy be-
cause he is se.parated from his eterneJ happiness but is dialecti-
cally working out the existential contradiction ot an eternal . 
happiness based on something in time. The paradoxical dialectic 
ot religiousness B will be based on the opposite of thought, which 
is faith. Hence, Kierkegaard says, "Religiousness A can exist in 
paganism."49 Bue he adds this qualification; l1H.eligiousness A 
must first be present in the individual before there can be any 
question of becoming aware of the dialectic ot B,n50 These words 
47 P2!tscri2~' 507. 
48 IbiS •• 50e. 
4.9 Ibig. J 495. 
50 Ibig., 494. 
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tial existence 4n inwardness, and action in inward-
ness--Existance as constant str1 vlng-i:;xistence as 
the synthesis ot the tinite with the infinite--
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by the ind 1 v idual-.St.ruggle and victory ot the 
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'" may be taken as another indication that Kierkegaard was not com-
pletely irrational in his approach to faith, which for him is the 
maximum state ot existence for th& individual. 
Paradoxical religiousness, or religiousness B, which 
Kierkegaard considers to be true religiousness, is contrasted wit 
religiousness A on the point ot'immanence • 
. It the individual is paradoxically dialectic, every vestige 
o! original immanence being annihilated and all connection 
cut ott, the individual being brought to the utmost verge ot 
existence, then we have eatadO~1S;r re~ioUin!!I. • • • The 
paradoxical religiousness rea s th anence and makes 
the fact of existing the absolute contradiction, not within 
immanence but against immanence. There is no ~onger any 
immanent }undamentl kinship between the temporal and the 
eternal because the eternal itself hBS entered time and 
would constitute there the kinship,'.L 
It can be seen from what Kierkegaard writes here that 
he is pushing the development ot becoming a Christian in the di-
rection ot .faith. The relationship by which the existing indivi-
dual dialectically establishes the g rounds for his eternal hap-
piness has as its ~'rmin. the existing individual as existing in 
time, and the eternal, also in time. 'rhe eternal is discovered 
in immanence. the inwardness of thought. In this relationship 
proper to religiousness A. the individual does find the contra-
diction of existence, but it 1s within himself in immanence. Re-
ligiousness B is not so. It finds no eternal determinant within 
itself. It establishes a rdlationship which conflicts with all 
51 ~ •• 507~508. 
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understanding. 
'l'he paradoxical religiousness defines the distinction ["here 
and herealtern] absolutely by accentuating paradoxically 
what it is to exist. For as the cernal came into the world 
at a moment ot time. the existing individual does not in the 
course of time come in to r,ela tion wi th the eternal and think 
about it (this is A), but in ~ it comes into relation with 
the eternal in ~~. so that ~relation is within time, 
and this relatlonih!p conflicts equally with all thinking '52 
whether one reflect upon the Individ~l or upon the Deity. 
Kierkegaard explains the paradoxical accentuation which 
is proper to religiousness B. 
The contradiction first emerges in the fact that the subject 
in the extremity of such subjective passion (in the ooncern 
for an eternal happiness) has to.base this upon an histori-
cal knowleege which at its maximum rem.ains an approximation. 
• •• But to req\.dre the greatest posnible subjective pas-
sion to the point of hating mother and father, and then to 
put this together with an historical knowledge, which at its 
maximum only can be approxL'11at1on--that is the contradic-
tion.53 
Here Kierkeeaard is explaining the contradiction of' ex-
stence in accordance with the principles of knowledge which he 
,oaited, namely, that the only reality which one can really know 
~. onets own. All other knowledge at best is an approximation 
)ecause in the knowine of at.her thir~gst 8omet~1ng is omitted by 
bstraction--existence. 
K1erkegaard further qualifies this sphere of religious-
ess B in terms ot the individual and the Deity, the individual'. 
52 Ibig., 506. 
53 Ibig., 510. 
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teaoher54 of existence. 
And again the oontradiction is 8. new expression for the tact 
existence is paradoxically accentuated; for it there is any 
vestige of il1:u:nanenoe, an eternal determinant left in the ex-
ister ...... then it is not possible.. The exister must have lost 
continuity with himself, must have become another (not dif-
ferent from himself within himself). and then by receiving 
the eondilion ot the Deity, he must become a new creature.55 
Two things to be noted in this passage are the becoming another 01 
..... 
the exister, and the giving of the condition by the Deity., 
The becomin& C\nothe,X; by the accentuation of the exis-
tence ot the God-man is '",hat Kierkegaard meuns by becoming a 
Christian. Though one be baptized a Christian, and though one 
know the doctrine ot Christianity, such a person is not a Chris-
tian, in Kierkegaard'So opinion, until he has become another. 'this 
final stage in the e xlstential dialectic is not selt-acquired, 
since it is outside the realm ot self-assertion, but it is a gift 
of the Deity. The gitt is the condition for faith. Faith is fi-
nally viewed in connection with the absolute paradox. "Faith is 
the objective uncertainty due to the repulsion of the absurd held 
fast by the pa.ssion of inwardness, '\.'1hich in this instance is in-
tensified to the utmost degree.. 'l'his formula fits only the be-
liever, ..... and solely the believer who is related to the ab-
solute paradox.,,56 One more quot,tinn from Kierkegaard will bring 
54 Ibig., 508; also Fragm~nMs, 5-17. 
55 P~stsxriRtJ 510. 
56 Ibid., 540. 
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'" Kierkegaard's explanation of the problem ot Christianity back to 
the s'tarting point ot hi s doctrine. That, point was the question, 
ffAre Christianity and speculative philosophy reconcilable?" K:1er-
kegaard replies again lifter he has shown theliJaY by which one 
should become a Christian. 
'fhe datini tion ot what it ia to be a Christian prevents the 
erudite or anxious deliberation of approxication from entic-
ing the individual into byways so that he becomes 60 erudite 
instead ot becoming a Christian; for the decision lies in the 
subject. But inwardnesG has again found its speci.f'ic mark 
whereby it is ditferentiated tram all other inwardness and 
is not disposed of by the chatty category ot Nquite differ-
entlyff which fits the case ot every passion at the moment ot 
passion.n51 . 
The third sphere of existence should not be concluded 
before mention is made of two categories which Kierkegaard places 
,,;ithin the two types of religious existence. The first catep;ory, 
::~uil t-conseiousness. is proper to reli;iousness A; the seconi. 
sin-consciousness, is proper to paradoxical religiousness. 
According to Kierkegaard, guilt-consciousness is the 
tfdecisive expression for the existential pathos.r,5S Kierkegaard 
speaks more fully on this notion in connection with eternal hap-
piness. 
But how can the consciousness of guilt be the decisive ex-
pression for the relationship of an exister to an eternal 
happiness, and this in such a way that every exlster who has 
57 1&i4_, 
,g Ib:t£., 469. 
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not this consciousness 1s ~ i~ not related to his eternal 
happiness? IDne might think-t~th1s consciousness is an 
expression of the tact that one is not related to it, the 
decisive expression of the faet that one is lost and the re-
lationship is relinquished. The answer is not difficult. 
Precisely because it is the exister who is to relate himself 
while guilt is at the same time the most concrete expression 
for the relationship •••• Guilt is the expression for the 
strongest selt-ass$rtion of existence •••• 59 
Guilt consciousness i~ the expression ot the relation 
constitued in reliziousness A. Kierkegaard says this in another 
manner. rtThe consciousness of guilt still lies essentially in 
iramanence. rt60 It is a "higher expression of this relationship ot 
the individual to eter lal happiness than is suffering,,,!>l Guilt 
consciousness is acquired by the individual through his freedom. 
And in the sufferingot guilt consciousness, guilt at onoe 
assuages and rankles. It assuages bee use lt is an expre .. 
sion of freedom as t.his is found in the religious sphere, 
where the positive 1s reg~gniZeable esthetically: freedom 
recognizable by freedom. 
clere Klerkegaard. seems to be making the point that tIde expressio 
of the relationship of the incli vidual to eternal happiness con-
tnins two aspects. One is that the guilt consciousness 1s pathe-
tic in itself by virtue of the individual's being infinitely oon-
59 Ib~g., 4'10. 
60 l.l?i:.9.. , 474. 
61 Ib~d. , 475. 
62 Ibig. 
carned in baing separated from his eternal happiness. Under this 
aspect guilt rankles. It assuages, however, in that the indivi-
dual perceives that this expression of the pathetio based on hi. 
relationship to the eternal is due to his freedom. his free de-
cisiveness. This he has lJosited by the selt-sGsertion of his 
ethico-religious existence. Moreover, guilt-consciousness is 
found only in the sp ere of immanence where the individual has 
made the decision of relating himself to an eternal tlappiness. 
Consciousness ot sin 1s distinct from guilt-conscious-
ness and is proper to reli&iousness B. Similar to the expression 
of the religiousness of immanence, sin-consciousness "is the ex-
pression for the paradoxical transformation of existence. Sin 1s 
the new existence-medium. n6) 
Kierkegaard further distinguishes these two categories 
by the way in v;-hich the individual acquires them. 
Henee the individual is unable to aoquire sin-consciousness 
by himsQlf", as he can guilt-consciousness; for in guilt-con-
sciousness the ldenti ty of the subject ~"i th himself is pre-
served. and sin-consciousness, on t he other hand. is an al-
teration of the very subject himself, \mich shows that out-
side of' the individual t'iha t power must be \<,,111ch makes clee1r 
to him the fact that in coming into life he has become 
another than hg,was. has become a ::.:;inner. 'l'h1s power is the 
Deity in time. It 
From the above treatment of Bin-consciousness, a deeper 
insight into religiousness .B can be had. Basically Kierkegaard 
6) lbig., 516. 
64 lW., 517. 
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is saying the same thing that he said concerning paradoxical re-
ligiousness. It is the sphere where the individual is related 
paradoxically to the Deity. which is the poyer outside the exis-
ting individual 8i ving to the exi s tel' the e<mdi tion to become 
another by faith, to accentuate another's existence-tela t ot the 
God-man. (the eXIr ession of the' pat lOS involved in this relation ... 
ship is called sin-consciousness. The ere£', ture, the existing 
subject before the eternal in time, is annihilated and is abso-
lutely different from God. 'rhe greatest point of difference be .... 
tween God and theexister is sin. 
Further treatement on the doctrine of religiousness is 
found in K1erkegaard's Feat and Ttem£'~Il&. Stag!! .sn Life'.! ~a.t, 
the later ,;~o~rnal~b P!~irer. T[aining !a Christian!tx;, E:;Uty'" 
Discourses. It shou.ld be noted that Kierkegaard intended to stop 
IWriting with the publication of the r.o~t!S'lri2Si. But attacks upon 
him by a weekly publication, The CQl'saJ.r. forced him to take up 
:'\i S pen in defense of himself' fJ The,"orks whlc;1 loll owed were 
almost entirely ('eligiou8 in character. 
A t r8atment of the spheres of existence in Kierkegaard 
~ould not be cCimplete if mention of the two Ifzones" of existence 
iIlere not made. rtT~"iere are thus three spheres of existence: t •• 
two boundary zones correspond to these: irony, constituting the 
boundary between the esthetic and the et''lical; humor, as the boun-
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dary that separates the ethical from the religious_,,6, Irony, 
which is an intermediate stage between the esthetic and the ethi-
cal 1s defined by Kierkeg~lard in the follolrJing way. 
Irony is a synthesis ot ethical passion which infinitely ac-
centuates inwardly the person of the individual in relation 
the the ethical requirement and of culture, \mich infinitely 
abstracts externally from the personal J&2. as one finitude 
among all the other finitudes and partic\ilarities. This ab-
straction causes the emphasis in the first attitude to pass 
unnoticed. and herein lie. the art of the ironisti which also insures that the first movement shall be tru y infinite 
The masses of men live in the converse manner; they are con-
cerned to be something when somebody is looking at them; 
they are if possible something in their own eyes when others 
observe them; but im'(ardly when the absolute requirement 
looks in upon them66there they have no taste for accentuati their own persons. 
Irony, then,according to Kidrkegaard is "an existential 
determlnation,ft67 that is, it is a passion which follows upon the 
irmnedii'lcy of the esthetic sphere and which accentuates the exis-
tential contradiction, the ethical requirement in self-assertion. 
This is what KierkegLh~rd means by the Itfirst movement shall be 
truely infinite." This is the inward aspect of irony, its exis-
tontial quality. But it also has a rererence to externality. !hi 
referenoe c onsti tlltBs its cultural aspect. By aul ture here ... KieI'-
kegaard means a development or the psersonality of the individual 
in spirit.61! 
66 Po§tsgr'Jr_. 449~50. 
61 I,bf~. 
68 Ibis! •• 450. 
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'l"he cultural or external a spect of irony is what distinguishes 
the truly ethical individual from people who are not inwardly in-
terested in tbeir existence. The irony consists in the tact that 
the ironist is not interested with what he appears to be exter-
nally, as is the case ususlly 'with most people. but he is inter-
ested with his inward reality. He may appear to the observer to 
be interested in the activity of externality, but the irony of it 
is that he is interested in the opposite, Kierkegaard reters to 
irony as the ino,ggnt!i2 or the ethicist. He explains this,. 
But why does the ethicist use irony as his incgiRitg1 Be-
cause he grasps the contradiction there is between the man-
ner in which he exists inwardly and the tact that he does 
not outwardly express 1t. For the ethioist does indeed re. 
veal himself. in 80 tar as he pours h1mself forth in the 
tasks of tac:tual reality 1n which he lives; but this is 
something that the immediate individual also does! and what 
makes him. an ethicist is the movement of' the ~,pir t by which 
he sets his outward life inwardly in juxtaposition with the 
infinite requirement of the et6hical. and this i. something that is not direotly apparent. 9 
This explanation ot irony is consistent with Kierke-
ga.srd's theDry of' subjectivity. It is another explanation of the 
subjective, existiing individual who is infinitely interested in 
his existence and his eternal happiness. 'l'he notion 0.£ irony was 
always very interesting to Kierkegaard, especially in connection 
with his study of Socrates, his pagan prototype. He wrote his 
masterts thesis on lh! Cqnce2t 2! Ironx ~tth Congtant Ret!renct 
..• 
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Hum.or, the corresponding sone of existence, is the in-
termediary stage between the ethical sphere and the religious 
sphere. Kierkegaard explains it in this way: 
So a g:ain in the case of the humorist and the religious indi-
vidual since according to the foregoing the dialectic of 
the religious sphere itself'forbids direct expression. for-
bids the outward differenoe by which recognition could be 
effected, protests against the assumed commensurability of 
the external, ••• the humorous ••• sets tho God .... idea 
into conjunotion with the other things and evokes the oon-
tradictiont but he does not maintain a relationship to God 
in terms or religious passion !~riite s1c diytul. he trans-
.corm s '1.1mselt il1stead into a e.t~ng an(l yet profound ex-
change-center for all these transactionsl but he does not himself stand related to God. The relig OUS man does the 
same, he sets the God-idea into juxtapoxition with every-
thing and sees the contradiQfion, but in his inmost conscious 
ness, he is related to God.7 
Humor again 1s that whereby the existing individual re-
lates the f'a.cts of externality to the God-idea. but by this rela .. 
tion the individual himself is not related to the God-idea. 
Hence, Kierkegaard distinguishes this zone of existence from real 
religiousness by placing it in a pOSition propaedeutic to the 
latter. In explaining. humor, he admits that external tects will 
have some rels.tion to the raligious individual. The dialectic 
of the religious sphere itself forbids reference outward and per-
mits only to the inwardly existing individual in his subjeotivity 
.. ,. 
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CHAPTER I 
SORSN A. lI~KEGAARD 
Born May 5, 19lJ in Copenhagen. Spren Aabye Kierkegaard 
ente~ed a period ot Denmarkts history which was at once poll~1-
cal11 disintegrating and reviving in the field ot literature. In 
the year of Kierkegaardts birth Denmark went bankrupt. A few 
yearS prior to his birth the British fleet bombarded Copenhagen 
and seised the Dano-Norwegian fleet. In the year atter his birth 
the Vanish.Norwegian union was dissolved. In the year of his 
birtl1 the celebrated sculptor. Bertel 'lhor~ialdsen, 'Was forty-
three years old. Adam Gottlob Oehenschlaeger. outstanding as the 
greaitest of Danish romantic poets, and Hans Christian Anderson, 
equally famous for his fairy tales, were his contemporaries in 
Denms.rk •1 
The religiou6 atmosphere ot his time was saturated with 
Lutheranism, which was the religion ot the Established Church in 
Denmsrk. The ,theology of his day had been shot through with He-
gelian philosophy. which was the rage in Germany and Denmark at 
1 For more historica.l data on Kierkegaard's backfrouna, 
the reader is referred to David Swensonts work. S2!!!llih'M bgu~ 
Kierke~a~rdt Minneapolis, 1941. 1-)1. 
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r.eference to the external. Kierkegaard refers to this expression 
of the religious individual related to externality as humor be-
cause it is based on the comical, that is, an incongruity. This 
incongruity he explain.s as follows: 
The comical is brought out when the hidden inwardness comes 
into relationship with an euvironment. in that the religious 
individual comes to hear and see that which ~men brought 
into conjunction with his inllard passion produces the comic 
errect. Hence even when two religious individuals converse 
with one another, the one will produce a comic impression on 
the other. for each of them will constantly have his own in-
wardness 1n mind, and will now hear what the other says in 
the light of this, and hear it !.J.8 comical t because neither dares directly express themcret ot inwardness; at moat they 
will entertain a suspicion o.r one another because of the 
humoristic undertone.72 . 
Kierkcgaardts explanation of the humorous and thE! comi-
cal is consonant l,1ith his previous explanation of subject.ivity 
and ethical truth, Truth cannot be oommunicated directly but 
only indirectly since in the process ot knowing something, one 
must abstract from existence. Since existence is the reality ot 
the ethical individual. and since the existential relation to the 
absurd is the reality or the religious individual, it is clear 
that these re.lities cannot be communicated directly to another 
individual. Communication with others must therefore be indirect 
and the passion which accompanies this indirection in connection 
with the ethical sphere is irony, and in connection with and pre-
paratory to the religious sphere is humor. 
,. 
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Irony and humor are the last of the more important qua-
litis. \'/hich Kierkegaard att.ribu.tes to the .t"'.Jli;:;ious sphere ot 
existence. The religious sphere of existence in briaf might be 
summed up as follows: there are tt.'iO types of religiousness, re-
Ligiousness A. and religiousness B. Religiousness A is d stined aa 
selt-annihilation before God. Lt is held 1n the sphere of imman-
ence. Paradoxical reliJ;iousness, or religiousness B. is had \"ihen 
the individual is pa:radoxically dialectic (by faith alone). and 
every vestige of original irmnanence (thought in being) is annihi-
lated. At this point the individual is at the utmost verge ot 
existence. This is the sphere or transcendence" .faith. the ul-
timata stage in the dialectic. Suffering is proper to t he reli-
gious sphere, which is based on the positing of one's eternal 
happiness upon an approximation (the historical truth, the absurd, 
the paradox), a thing which can be done only when one haa in one-
self no eternal determinant, and hence t.his again Is connected 
~lth the paradoxical accentuation of existence. By the accentu-
~tion of the contradiction in the paradoxical relation, the indi-
!vidual loses continuity with selt and becomes another as a crea-
ture created to bocome Ii Christian. 'fhis is the miracle of crea-
tion. Hence the Christian lives in faith dependent on God and the 
paradox tor his eternal happiness. I 
'f.-l 
There are two zones in the spheres of existence, that of 
~rony and that of humor. The first is theaKternal appearance of 
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the ethicist. 'Nho seems to be concerned with externality. but ao ... 
tually and ironicc,lly is only concerned with l1is own existence. 
Llhe latter, humor, is the expression of the religious indiV'idual 
t"tlho is related to extornc:l t;!ings. External things are related 
to h1r'1 by an incongruity. For the religious individual always 
has his inwardness in mind. Whatever is comrnunicated to him pro-
duces a COfnic effect. ::since he knows that nothing can be communi-
cated to h1m directly. 
The two categories lound in religiousness A and reli-
gioksness B respectively are guilt-consciousness and sin-consc! 
ness. Thase are the expression of the pathos which the creature 
teels before the ;1bsutd. T:-ds feeling results trom the relation 
established by each type of religiousness. 
TIle entire theory of Kierkeg ard might be summarized in 
its broadest outlines as follows: he is presented with a probl 
how to beco;,le a Ohristian. He r'~jeets an explanation by Hegelian 
speculative philosophy because it is a philosophy without exis-
tence. The objective approach is likewise invalid since it ab-
stracts trom eXistence, and cannot reprQsent reality as it is ac-
tually but only as it is potentially. His solution is posited in 
subjectivity. His subjectivity is one in which the individual is 
solely interested in his own exist~mce. The greatest concern or 
his existence 1s his eternal .ha~.piness. This happiness he as-
sures himself by constituting a relation with the God-man. This 
'"I 
relation is established by faith which is the "crucifixion of un-
derstanding. n Faith is the ultimate stage of the dialectical 
mOVCffif.mt throuGh various spheres of existence. 'l'ho changes 
throughout the dialectic are effected by decisiveness or the free 
will of the existing individual. Ultimately the individual ar-
rives at the utmost verge of enstence by a final f'leap" (an act 
of deaisi veness by \'rhich one ~?;oes from one sphere to another). 
This last "leap" is the act ot faith. 
l·:ost of the major points and parts of Kierkegaard t s 
theory of' existence have been prensnted in this thesis. 
been taken for the most part from the Postscrip~. Kiel'kegaard's 
most philosoph! ),;ark. A further study of ti"h:se points may be mad 
from different pointa of view such as Kierkegaard assumed in hi. 
other works. Before this thesis is concluded, a brief criticism 
of Kierkegaardts theories is in order. This criticism will tol-
low immediately in the next ohapter. 
CHAPTER V 
CRITICISM OF KIZRKEGAARD'S PHILOSOPHY 
The purpose ot this criticism is to determine in some 
degree the value of Kierkegaardfs theory of existence from the 
standpoint ot experience and from the point ot consistency within 
his own system. 
A point ot cardinal importance in the theory ot Klerke-
gaard is his ethico-religious point ot view. Viewing reality 
only trom this standpoint, Kierkegaa.rd concerned himself with that 
aspect of reblity which would have bearing on his practical prob-
leM--how to become a Christian. Because of this point ot view, 
he wa::,; solely conerned with the practical aspect or reality, not 
with the speculative. 
It was this point ot view which gave Kierkegaard so 
great an advantage in his a"ttack upon Hegelianism. Using the 
standpoint of the individual and ot existence as his basis of at-
tack upon Hegelia.nism, Kierkegaard was in a very apt position to 
reject a speculative philosophy ot essences which destroyed that 
about which Kierkegaard was most conserned--the existence ot the 
indi vidual. 
~ In the speculative philosophy ot Hegel, Kierkegaard 
found no help for his problem ot existence. Kierkegaard was well 
aware that mants paramount problem in existence is the problem ot 
Christianity. Each individual must attain his final end, eternal 
happiness, and he must attain it through Christianity by relating 
himself to Christ. In this Kierkegaard is right, 
In the speculative philosophy at Hegel, however, lier .... 
kegaard realized that there was no room even tor the possibility 
l 
or Christianity. /Christianity is concerned with the individual 
and his relation to Christ. But in Hegeliani_ there is little 
empha.sis put on the individual. The "Syst_" is what counts. 
[-
'Christianity 1s concerned with the particular differences ot in-
l 
dividuals and the various ways by which each one strives for his 
eternal happiness •.. The "System" is busy with the classification 
ot the species ot reality with little concern for the differences 
in man which arise from existence. The individual is absorbed in-
to the "System" and loses his identity as a Christian in the all-
embracing identity of thought and being. It is easy to see the 
reason for Kierkegaard's antagonism toward this philosophy ot 
idealism which showed such scant understanding of a primary as-
!pect of reality-the existence of the individual. In this res-
pect Kierkegaard is justified in his attact on Hegel. 
Kierkegaard was so Ooncerned with destroying the Hege. 
lian philosophy of essences, however. that he fell into a position 
which was the extreme opposite ot Hegelianism, a philoaophy ot 
! 
existence completely divorc$d trom essenee. I Kierkegaard's "ac-
/ 
tion to Hegel~anism was so violent that he made two mistakes-
that of underrating speculative philosophy and ot overrating ex-
istence. This, again, was largely due to his utter concern with 
the practical problem of becoming a Christian. 
In underrating the value of speculative philosophy, 
Kierkegaard constructed a theory ot exi stence w hleh lacked a me-
I 
taphysiealfoundation. /Existence .for Kierkegaard is the ethical 
i 
re<"llity or the individual. It is the consciousness ot the indi-
vidual through reflection on his own existence. Finally, it is 
a ~stant striving of the individual toward a relation with the 
infinite through faith, 
What Kierkegaard says her.;) is true in a sense r rom the 
standpoint ot Christian asceticism, and from a purely ethical and 
psychological point of view, it he presupposes the necessary 
loundation ot a speculative philosophy which gives validity to 
these notions in their own order. But the entire tone ot Kier-
kegaard'. writings seems to indicate that he made no such suppo-
sitions. Having rejected the philosophy of Hegel, he sa_s to 
identify all speculative philosophy with that particular ph1loso-j, 
phy ot eS~Hmees. \:Hence his conceptional existence 1s limited to 
the practical order. It is merely the repetition ot the acts of 
volition. reflection. consciousness, and thinking ot the indivl-
90 
dual. These acts are meaningles$ unless they are the acts of an 
ethical being, one who has a human essence and a corresponding 
act of existence. Such an individual. in order to act as one 
ethically concerned with his existence, must be conceived as a 
person endowed with reason, tree will, and the power to use the •• 
faculties which tlow trom his human essence. But to all appear-
ances, Kierkegaard gives no such foundation tor his theory ot ex-
istence, ,and actually seems to do away with any such presupposi-
tions when he rejects speculative philosophy as phantom, and ab-
2tract thought as the medium ot pure possibility_ 
Kierkegaard shows no concern with ~ha~ is existing, but 
only with the acts of existence in the individual. This leads 
him to a form of psychological subjectivism. In other words. 
Aierkegaard has a form of philosophy which includes a.ll forms ot 
truth within the individual. By this position Kierkegaard rules 
out the possibility of an epistemology and psychology which al-
low and eXplain an intmtional order by which the individual comEU 
in contact with. and grasps hold of, reality which is outside the 
individual. Such a philosophy immediately precludes the possibi-
lity ot the individual to Ii ttain truth which lies beyond his onn 
person. and restricta him to the realm of his own.l.&2- It cuts 
otf any contact of the individual with the existence ot other be-
inga, and destroys not only the existence of a ;)hilosophy which 
embraces all of reality, but even the possibility of attainin.g a 
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a speculative foundation for such a philosophy. Any objective 
body or truth will be meaningless to the ir"!di vidual who has cut 
himself from the very means by ~nich such truth can be attained. 
Yet it is evident from experience that we know other beings as 
existing, and trom this knowledge, once it has become general and 
speculative, we know more about'our individual existenoe. lier-
kegaard may have ended in this subjectivism beoause he was eon-
cerned with a psychological analysis of the workings of his own 
soul. and this preoccupation may hsye blinded him to the reality 
of existence outside him. 
~~'hen Kierkegaard speaks of existence as a oonstant stri-
ving and becoming, he seems to take for granted the speculative 
foundation which he rejects. If he does not take this foundation 
tor granted, t hen he has a form at Heracliteanism in wbich all re 
ality is becoming and there·is no permanence. \1£ for Kierkegaard 
existence is merely the succession ot the inward acts of the in-
dividual, a repetition ot the moment a2K. then there 1s no sub-
ject to give permanence for the identity of the individual. Kier. 
kegaard speaks of the iadi vidual as though he vlere the subject in 
which the acts of inwardness and becoming inhere. But he has lai< 
no .roundation for such an assumption, and seemingly has rejected 
the possibil! ty or one. By assuming the ethical point ot view 
as an adequate view ot all reality, Kierkegaard cut himself off 
trom the possibility of arriving at any doctrine ot substance 
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which could have given to him a foundation for his observations 
on the ethiaal order of reality. From the standpoint of Christi. 
ani ty, Kierkegaard constructed a philosophy of the prnctioL=!.l or .. 
del' only. But a philosophy of the practical order of ree,lity 
,dthout a philosophy of the basis of reality is like a castle 
built on sand. A practical philosophy without roots in a specula-
tive philosophy which investieates the causes, standards, and the 
basis ot the practical Or'der, ~annot give an ultirllate reply to the 
questions which arise from an adequate view ot all reality. 
Kierkrgaard conceived Christianity and the problems involved in 
it as though it were divorced from the basic principles which are 
essential to Christianity itself. Christianity without a basic 
speculative knowledge or truths such as causality, neceSSity, 
contingency, finite and inlinite being. substance and accident, 
and finality, to mention some, would be ditf'icult to explain.< 
But Kierkegaard would h.?ve no system such a s a related 
study of these aspects of reality implies. He says there can be 
no system that is existential, but that there cant.'. a logical 
system of essences. Again, his Hegelian background precludes the 
possibility ot a t ird explanation of reality--one based on the 
combination of essence and existence in being. Kierkegaardts ex-
clusion of an existential system seems to indicate that he wants 
either an existence without an essence, the basis ot pennanenee, 
or else acts ot existence without substance. 
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In tlH) first case, from experience one knows that one 
cannot conceive existence without implicj.tly conceiving that 
which exists. In the second case, ·the individual kno,,!s that ther 
is a permanent subject, the en~, wi!ich performslihe psychological 
acts of which it is consciousness. Grant that 'there is a repeti-
tion of the moment ll2l!' The intlivldual is still conscious that 
the present moment of inwardness is his aot just a.s was the pre-
viou$ moment of inward.ness. K1erkegaard. no doubt, would have 
little interest in this philosophies.l analysis of' his concept or 
existenee. But if his thoory is to have any validity, then such 
philosophical suppositions must either be established or taken 
for granted. By limiting truth to the confines of the individual, 
and by restricting existence in the individual to his acts of in-
wardness, he ooemfl to have rejected any 6peculetive a.pproach to 
his problem, and to have reduced the individual -to t.he instabil-
ity of his repeated acts of inwardness devoid of any preinciple 
In keeping with his po:i.nt of view, Klorkegaard 8Rserts 
that only the e t,hically existing subject and <jot the cognitive 
subject is the re,l subject. Consis Gent \I.t thhis rejection ot 
speculative knO\dt~dge, Kierkeeat,rd\ere implies a pa.rtial skepti-
cism. He completely rules out pure thought, but grants some va-
lidity to abstract thought. But the validity which he grants ab-
stract thought in itself' seems to be useless since abstract 
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thought cannot gi va a v,,,lid presentation or real! ty. K!erkegaa.rd 
cla.ims that abstract thoup;ht can get hold or realtty only by nul-
lifying it, and this nullification consists in transforming it 
into possibility. The reason .for thl0 is that Ki~Jrkegaard admits 
that the individual can only know actual reality as possibility •. 
Reality as actuality is not known by the ex5.sting individual" be-
cause thought abrogates existence. Rea.1i ty for Kierkeganrd is 
not the all embracing ambit ot being, that which is or can be, bu 
merely that which is the existence of the individual. This theo-
ry of knowledge seems to be the co nsequence of his the ory of exis. 
tence according to which the individual is interested only in his 
own existende. But if' the individual cannot attrin rea11ty 8S it 
11, then he c·f:tn never attain any objective truth outside himself. 
This skepticism is at least one of the reasons which forced Kiar-
kegaard to seek ultima.tely an irrational s:>lutlon t.o his problem 
in at faith which \I.~as divorced from reason. This postula.te ot 
f'aith in his theory of knOt-fledge is another aspect of the psyCho-
logical subjecti vi em to which Kierkeg,;;,ard reduced himself'. By 
rejecting an objective approach to reality, Kierkegaard shut h:tm-
self' off trom any objeotive truth, and concemned himself to some 
form of exaggerated subjectivism. 
Spe!"~k1ng of truth, Kierkegaard says that Wien the (r~HaS­
tion of truth is raised in an objective manner, reflection is di-
rected objectively to the truth, as an object to which the knower 
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is I"elated. If only the <)oject to ' .• !h1c11 r:e is related is the 
truth. t;'~e subject is accounted to be truthful.l'.';)n the ques-
tion of the truth i3 rcdsed subjectively, reflection is d:trf~cted 
subj Gcti vely to the nf:~ ture \)f the inrii vidUftl t s rela. tion;3;dp to 
w;-:;ut is kno'J.m. If only the mode of the relationship is t'f~u.a.t the 
inJ,i vidual is truthful even if 'he should be rela.ted to ,,,hat is 
not true. 
:CLere Kierkegaard showa that is not concerned with an 
objecti ve stande:rd of truth. Any SL.lch disregard for obj ecti VEl 
, 
truth can only lead to a fom of relativism. for the only stan-
dard left by which truth may be detc!rmined iethe individual .. 
Even it good faith be supposed in the individual, it is hard to 
S0a how anything but anarch~ and chaos eould result from 3uch a 
philo~ophy. It there are as fl.i.any standards for truth as there 
are exist,ing individuals. and if the individual t a actions are to 
be determined by subjecti 'fe truth alone, then any such thIne aD 
an ordered society is out, of the queatdon. Such a relativism 
. \'lould possibly beget as ma.ny forms of Christianity ;'-'I.S ther~ ;;.trQ 
individuals trying to be Christi;:;,ns. There w'ould even he thH 
Po ssibl11ty that some such rorms of C~lr:istialli ty "muld cnnl,ra-
dict otbers. 
Ki,;:rkegaard says the t he is not <~o':lcern8d with the ~ 
of' Christianity, but with the how of becoming a Christian, Here 
he states in tet'l.'lG or Christ-ianity the relativism which he states 
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above in terms of knowledge 4 :Ienee. if he \tlere conuistont, Kier-
kee·::,ard sho\;,ld reject the.bjec t.l ve tea::dngs of Ghrist as he did 
other specula.ti va and ,)hj:;ct:i. ve knO't~l0dGe., In this case it is 
di.~ficult to see how the ind:i.vidual CQuld become a Ch::'istian in 
any way. Kicrkegaard j in(Jead, states tha.t he take;;.) for J:~anted 
the objective truth of Christic:ln.ity. But ;'1:'lHt he does not seem 
to see is that the ~ or truth of Christianity determines 'the 
how of bocoming a C~.ristian. If the acts by wIdell the individual 
becomes e Christian are to lead himl~o "'11 end outside hinmelf J 
then such acts must be directed by knowledge (if rt3Hllty outside 
the individual. But Kierkegaard h£w precluded t;his l:ossibility 
by rejecting any rat1.onnl npproach to reality or to Christianity. 
Hence, again, he is reduced to a form of irrationalism ,,.rhich ends 
in the bl:tnd leap of fa.ith. 0uch B blind leap is the logical 
C('flsequence of his theory of existence and knovlledge; but daily 
experience teaches us that a blind leap ot ~,iB nature is not 
usually found in the custollwry (:lctions of men. Before one puts 
faith In anyone or a.nythine. he usually seeks motives and reasons 
tor so doing. These motives ~lnd reasons are not :"'olltld in Kier ... 
kegaard's theory. 
Kierke.c.nard claims ths t 'the individual ca.nnot know the 
existenoe of another outside hl~5elf. But hiB entire doctrine 
points at, and culminates In. the existence or God, \.,h.ich he has 
not proved. A?:ain, if iH3 taKes t:lis exis(:,ence for granted. then 
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to speaking about it. Siflilarly, Kit:rkeGaal"d seem,s 'co ~'"e incon-
sf stant Nhen he t.!ishes to ostabl.i sh n rela'cion to the Dod-X':ml" 
cept by a;\proximation ( a,nd thic in not a lmol'!ledce of cln exL:;ting 
subject as 13 pch ) then he in estnblishing a relc'i tion to somet~b,ing 
which acc:ordine to hls Ol'm theory is non-c~dstent HS far ()s be 
lacon,earned" 
Another seemine inconsistency in Kicrkegciard is brcu£ht 
up in conneetj,on wi tt> hi.s t,heory of corrununlcat.lon. He clairns 
that the exiating individual can communicate I<'it'h another indivi-
dual only indirectly. This is ef.fected by a,'IH'oxlmatlon through. 
irony and humor. Such a relation seems to be unt,mable if the 
individual ean only attain his own existence. and if thO<lght ab-
rogates existence. Even if such a relation is indireot.~ow can 
such a relation be directed to an exintent person .. ,ho is knolfl1 
only as a pO$sibl11 ty? Actual relations cannot be 0ustalned ~d th 
possible t .. ~rm~.!l~,) since they are in difi'f3rent ordars. Here K~er­
ke~Aard "/~ s faoed with the obvious i'aet that ! )eo1"1e talk to one 
ana ther f and thrtt such eo.'P,.rnuniaa tion is eff'ected by ",'orda and 
ideas which actually stand tor reality as it is. Bitt once he had 
posited his theory of subjective existentiali.sm and of abrogation 
.. 
of existence by thought, tHo! could not explain a fac-t, whic~l is so 
individual C:lnnot be knm'!il1 by the existIng illdi'{L':ual, h9 $eems 
~artensen, and ths advsrsaries '~ho assailed him in tta :ors2i[_ 
te ·:!onfin·!s of hIs O'wn psychological ext:Jer12l1ce, does not tIt 
The final staJ:s of existence in Kierkegaardts theory 
brings up another difficulty w~ich can only be 9xplain~d by 3pe-
culative philosophy. By falth the individual i,;}sr.ablishe3 a r;:!la .... 
tion to the absolute V~191. But it existence is a constant stri-
v incl:, and as ~.h. .. ch rules out permanence of un e _"ist':'l1g subj Qct, 
hot-t can such a relat~ion exist? Finite relat.ions !llUSt have 11 su.b-
ject of inhormlce, since such relnvions are Qrdinat~ions of so:na-
t.hing Hhich is, r.ot of somethiu£; which is m-:..;rely beco~ing. Hence 
event'.) establish 30,ae sort or .alidity .for tIle blind leap of 
faith. Kierkegaard must presuppose a. philosoph~r in ~I/'hich thel"e i8 
rOOlll for an exL'3ti!& p€rlnanant subject int"lhich :.he a eta oJ: becom 
ing a Christian maJ inhere. 
To sum up this criticism, we may say that Ia;arkegaard 
ade two fundamental mistakes. He underrated epeculative philo-
OP~IY and over-rated existence. His ethico ... n~li:~ious approach to 
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realit.y iJlindad him t.o t.he fu.ll view of l'ealitiy i.l.ud cOll..l.'ined. him 
merely to th~ ethical aspect. .1i;;> tn.aory of suojective existen-
tiialiSla preauppo~es the basis oi' a spacula t,.;i.ve philosoptlY which 
he rejects. His theory of knowled'::;;8 involves (1 partial skepti-
cism, and limit.s the knowledge of ri:iality as it is to the confine 
of i;.he existing individual. This akEilpticiSDl in turn results in Ii 
relativism since truth is only subjective. That is truth is 
found only in the relaLion of the existing subject to something 
that~ is known. That which is known and to which the subject 1s 
related rnay be true or false objectively and. as such cause the in 
dividual little Goocern, 'l'his relativism causes Kierkegaard to 
be inconsistent when he tries to explain tlhe fact of communicatio 
and the rela.tion of tine individual to the absolute tel'll. 
In conclusion. it may be said that Kierkegaard rejected 
the very foundaLions which col.ild have given validity to his oh-
se.l'vatiohs on the e t~lical existence of the individual. His doc-
tr~.ue is HotL.O be taken as a special branch of philosophy: which 
has as its funa.al aim only the explanation of ethical realit.y. 
Kierkegaard himself seems to make the e trlical reality the only r 
ality that can be known and w ich has value. To take this doc-
trine thus as an adequate pitilosophy of reality is to mistake the 
part for the whole. 
If one would grant the validity of the above criticism. 
he would be led to conclude, after seeing the defects ot Kierke-
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exiQt.~ncet un epi>3temology to explain t.he .lCLlidity of wants know-
led",,;e or rauli ty f a psychology t.o explain {[,an f s knowledlbe of him-
~elf and ti:.l.e ..""orkings of ilis .i.'&.cull.,ies, hnd a natlJ.!'al t:.i.t.::olvbl t.o 
prove teJ.e exlSi.;,twca of God and explain '11an' 5 .. c·elati0H tu God. 
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